A Forensic Analysis of Global Imbalances by Chinn, Menzie David et al.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations Economics
10-2011
A Forensic Analysis of Global Imbalances
Menzie David Chinn
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Barry Eichengreen
University of California - Berkeley
Hiro Ito
Portland State University, ito@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Finance Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications and Presentations
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Chinn, Menzie David; Eichengreen, Barry; and Ito, Hiro, "A Forensic Analysis of Global Imbalances" (2011). Economics Faculty
Publications and Presentations. 58.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_fac/58
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
A FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Menzie D. Chinn
Barry Eichengreen
Hiro Ito
Working Paper 17513
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17513
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
October 2011
We thank Joe Gagnon for comments, Yothin Jinjarak and Joshua Aizenman for sharing the dataset
on the housing indexes and Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff for making the exchange rate regime
index publicly available. Erica Clower, and Jacinta Bernadette Rico provided excellent research assistance.Ito
thanks Portland State University for its financial support. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2011 by Menzie D. Chinn, Barry Eichengreen, and Hiro Ito. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.
A Forensic Analysis of Global Imbalances
Menzie D. Chinn, Barry Eichengreen, and Hiro Ito
NBER Working Paper No. 17513
October 2011
JEL No. F32,F41
ABSTRACT
We examine whether the behavior of current account balances changed in the years preceding the
global crisis of 2008-09, and assess the prospects for global imbalances in the post-crisis period. Changes
in the budget balance are an important factor affecting current account balances for deficit countries
such as the U.S. and the U.K. The effect of the “saving glut variables” on current account balances
has been relatively stable for emerging market countries, suggesting that those factors cannot explain
the bulk of their recent current account movements. We also find the 2006-08 period to constitute
a structural break for emerging market countries, and to a lesser extent, for industrialized countries.
We attribute the anomalous behavior of pre-crisis current account balances to stock market performance
and real housing appreciation; fiscal procyclicality and the stance of monetary policy do not matter
as much. Household leverage also appears to explain some of the standard model’s prediction errors.
Looking forward, U.S., fiscal consolidation alone cannot induce significant deficit reduction. For China,
financial development might help shrink its current account surplus, but only when it is coupled with
financial liberalization. These findings suggest that unless countries implement substantially more
policy change, global imbalances are unlikely to disappear.
Menzie D. Chinn
Dept. of Economics
University of Wisconsin
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
and NBER
mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu
Barry Eichengreen
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
549 Evans Hall 3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
and NBER
eichengr@econ.Berkeley.edu
Hiro Ito
Portland State University
1721 SW Broadway, Suite 241
Portland, Oregon  97201
ito@pdx.edu
 1
1. Introduction 
The prospects for the world economy remain murky at best. Yet it is not too early to 
examine the question whether global imbalances, specifically large current account deficits and 
surpluses, were important causes of the financial crisis of 2008. Recall, of the many explanations 
that have been forwarded -- ranging from lax financial regulation, skewed incentives associated 
with corporate governance, over-leveraging, securitization, and the actions of the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, to the conflict of interest problems faced by the ratings agencies, to 
excessively lax monetary policy – the excess of savings originating from East Asia and the oil 
exporters have occupied a central role in certain circles.  
Former Fed Chairman Greenspan argued that global imbalances were a key factor in the 
crisis. The easy access to savings from China, Japan and Germany encouraged profligacy in the 
deficit countries, most notably the United States and the United Kingdom. Asset bubbles and 
busts were the consequence.1 
With the passage of time, additional data relevant for identifying the determinants of 
imbalances have become available.  Earlier studies, including Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008), did 
not have available to them information on the determinants of savings, investment and current 
account balance during the crisis.  The objective of this study is therefore to update those earlier 
analyses and ask whether the determinants of global imbalances have changed.  It is to inquire 
into the prospects for (dangers of) renewed imbalances are going forward.  
We do not regard this as a postmortem on the crisis. Instead, we treat our investigation as 
a prospective forensic analysis, aimed at preventing a repetition. We use out of sample 
forecasting exercises to ask whether there is a danger that the United States will return to its 
spendthrift ways, and that China, Japan, and other East Asian economies will provide it with the 
finance needed to do so.  
We focus on the proximate determinants of global imbalances prior to and during the 
crisis years. Using projections of those determinants, we then undertake a series of forecasting 
exercises.  Finally we consider how capital flows and current account balances are likely to 
evolve under different scenarios. 
More specifically: 
                                                 
1 Council of Economic Advisers (2009) is the most comprehensive explication of this view. 
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1) We reexamine the determinants of current account balances, savings and investment using 
a variant of the model developed by Chinn and Prasad (2003)  and Ito and Chinn (2009); 
2) We investigate whether there is a structural break in the relationship between global 
imbalances and its proximate determinants around the time of the crisis.  To shed further 
light on the global imbalances, we will examine the determinants of the “excessive 
imbalances” of current account balances; 
3) Finally, we make some forecasts on the current account balances for the countries that ran 
major current account imbalances prior to the global crisis, and ask whether global 
imbalances between the U.S. and East Asia are likely to reemerge going forward.  
In the course of this analysis we will consider several familiar, not necessarily mutual 
exclusive, hypotheses and arguments that have been offered to explain global imbalances.  These 
include the twin deficit hypothesis (Chinn 2005), the saving glut hypothesis (Greenspan, 2005a,b, 
Bernanke, 2005, and Clarida, 2005), and  the asset bubble driven explanation of current account 
balances (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009; Fratzscher and Straub, 2009). 
 
2. Review of Competing Hypotheses 
In the years from 1998-2008, economists focused their attention on the causes and 
consequences of the expanding current account deficits and surpluses. The pattern of current 
account balances was interesting from an economic standpoint, in that it did not appear to 
conform to what would be predicted by standard economic theories. They were troubling from a 
policy standpoint in that they were unprecedentedly large by post-war standards. 
Throughout the first decade after 2000, the United States ran enormous current account deficits. 
China, the rest of East Asia, and the oil exporting countries ran correspondingly large current 
account surpluses. In 2008-09, these current account balances drastically reversed, albeit 
incompletely, as a global financial crisis engulfed the world economy (Figure 1). The proximity 
of the two events naturally leads to the question whether the two phenomena are related, or 
causal in nature.  
The rise of global imbalances, defined as large current account balances, has been 
explained in a variety of ways. These explanations include (1) trends in saving and investment 
balances, (2) the intertemporal approach, (3) mercantilist behavior, (4) the global saving glut, 
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and (5) distortions in financial markets. Note that the explanations are far from mutually 
exclusive.  
The saving-investment approach takes the perspective from the national saving identity 
which states that the current account is equal to the budget balance and the private saving-
investment gap. This is a tautology, unless one imposes some structure and causality.  
One particularly simple variant of this approach relies upon assuming that the shocks 
primarily hit the government sector. Then changes in the budget balance are quasi-exogenous, 
and the current account consequently responds. The inspiration for this perspective is the mid-
1980’s experience with the Reagan era tax cuts and defense buildup. During that episode, the 
budget deficit and current account deficits both yawned to unprecedentedly large magnitudes, 
inspiring the term “the twin deficits”. 
Upon inspection, the simple interpretation of the twin deficits clearly does not hold, 
beyond the mid-1980s, and 2001-2004 (Figure 2). Of course, other types of shocks perturb the 
economy, and once one allows for shocks to the other components of aggregate demand, or to 
the supply side, then no such positive correlation need hold at all times. However, that does not 
deny the validity of that view during the last decade.2 
A systematic approach involves modeling the current account by explicitly focusing on 
the determinants of private investment and saving, and adding those variables to the budget 
balance. Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008) use a sample of developed and developing countries over 
the period 1971 to 2004 and control for a similar set of variables as used in Chinn and Prasad 
(2003). They find that government budget balances, initial net foreign asset positions and, for 
developing countries, indicators of financial deepening are positively correlated with current 
account balances. Among developing countries, they also find that higher terms of trade 
volatility is associated with larger current account surpluses (or smaller deficits). Greater 
macroeconomic uncertainty apparently increases domestic saving and also has a slightly negative 
impact on investment. The degree of openness to international trade appears to be weakly 
associated with larger current account deficits among developing countries.3 Note that because 
they include average GDP growth and initial net foreign assets in the regressions, the saving-
                                                 
2 See for instance Chinn (2005). A dissenting view is Truman (2005). The September 2011 WEO also has a chapter 
on the twin deficits. 
3 They also find limited evidence to support the patterns of evolutions in current accounts predicted by the stages-of-
development hypothesis. Other potentially important variables such as indicators of capital controls and average 
GDP growth, however, appear to bear little systematic relationship with current account balances. 
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investment approach is consistent with some aspects of the intertemporal approach (discussed 
below).4 
Their key finding is that the budget balance is an important determinant of the current 
account balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance variable is 0.15 in 
a model controlling for institutional variables. A series of robustness checks yield the results that 
a one percent point increase in the budget balance leads to a 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point increase 
in the current account balance.5 For the United States, their analysis confirms the view that it is a 
saving drought – not investment boom – that is contributing to the enlargement of current 
account deficits, although there is some evidence of anomalous behavior in the 2001-04 period. 
For the East Asian countries, Chinn and Ito find some evidence that the current account balances 
are somewhat larger than predicted by their empirical models.  
The intertemporal approach is the mainstay of the rigorous approach to explaining current 
account imbalances. In this perspective, consumption today is to equal a share of the present 
discounted value of future expected net output, or net wealth. Hence, changes in consumption are 
due solely to changes in either the interest rate, or changes in expectations about future net 
output due to productivity shocks or reductions in investment and government spending. 
The U.S. experience of the late 1990’s can therefore be rationalized by an anticipation of a future 
productivity boom which induces a immediate increase in consumption, resulting in a current 
account deficit.6 In the context of America in the 2000’s, to consume more now means to import 
more and export less. The deficits leading up to the financial crisis of 2008-09 are more difficult 
to fit into this approach. A large proportion of capital flowing to the United States takes place in 
the form of purchases of U.S. government securities – not purchases of American stocks or direct 
investment in its factories, as it did in the years leading up to 2000.  Moreover, the heavy 
involvement of foreign central banks in purchasing U.S. assets suggests that the profit motive 
was not behind the ongoing flows to the United States.7 
                                                 
4 Gruber and Kamin (2007) obtain similar results for a smaller panel of 61 countries spanning the 1982-2003 period. 
They find that including a crisis dummy for the East Asian countries statistically explains those countries’ current 
account balances. However, their results do not shed light on the source of US deficits. Hence, while the stylized 
facts are relevant to the question at hand, they pertain to the period before the appearance of global imbalances. 
5 Smaller estimates of the fiscal impact are reported by Bussiere (2005), Corsetti and Muller (2006), and Gruber and 
Kamin (2007). 
6 See Pakko (1999) for an early interpretation in this vein. Note that the empirical evidence for the theoretical model 
underpinning this argument is weak. See Nason and Rogers (2006). 
7 There are numerous ways in which to account for intertemporal effects in current account dynamics. Chinn and 
Lee (2009) apply a structural VAR approach, which allows for transitory and permanent shocks to drive the current 
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A formal test of the intertemporal approach, as applied to the recent US experience, was 
conducted by Engel and Rogers (2006). They model the current account as a function of the 
expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share of 
world GDP (where the world is the advanced economies). The key difficulty in testing this 
approach is in modeling expected output growth; using a Markov-switching approach, they find 
that the U.S. is not keeping on a long-run sustainable path.8 9However, using survey data on 
forecasted GDP growth in the G-7, their empirical model appears to explain the evolution of the 
U.S. current account remarkably well.  
Another prominent view attributes the East Asian surpluses to explicitly mercantilist 
behavior. From this perspective, the developing countries of East Asia have followed an export 
led development strategy. That export led strategy resulted in rapid growth; however, starting in 
the mid-1990’s, current account surpluses evolved into current account deficits, as investment 
boomed.  
In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, investment levels collapsed, while saving rates 
remained relatively high. Currencies depreciated sharply in the region; however, over time, East 
Asian central banks maintained their currencies at fairly weak levels. For some observers, this 
observation is sufficient to explain the relatively large and persistent current account surpluses in 
the region. One difficulty with this explanation is that the export led development path has been 
in place for decades; the explanation for the sharp break post-1997 is missing.  
Note that while the model explains one half of the current account imbalances, it does not 
explain the other side -- namely why it is that the United States, United Kingdom, and specific 
other developed countries ran substantial deficits. In a series of papers, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, 
and Garber (2003; 2008) interpret the U.S. current account deficit as the outcome of concerted 
mercantilist efforts by East Asian state actors. In this context, the financing of America’s trade 
(and budget) deficit is an explicit quid pro quo for continued access to American markets. Their 
explanation argues that the government interventions are aimed at supporting exporting 
industries. 
                                                                                                                                                             
account and the real exchange rate. Using the same approach as in Lee and Chinn (2006), they examine the US, the 
euro area and Japan, and find that a large share of the 2004-07 US current account is inexplicable using their model. 
8 Engel and Rogers use data over the 1790-2004 period for one of their sustainability tests. The survey-based tests 
rely upon a shorter sample, 1994-2004. 
9 Choi, Mark and Sul (2008) allow for different rates of discount, and can replicate the pattern of imbalances in a 
two-country model. 
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There are also problems with this thesis. Most notable is the mysterious aspect of timing: 
East Asian savings began flowing to the United States in 2003. Why not earlier, if the 
mercantilist impetus had been there all along? For a thorough critique, see Prasad and Wei 
(2005). On the other hand, for emerging markets, Gagnon (2010) shows that current account 
balances are highly correlated with central bank official intervention.  
An alternative interpretation for the large scale reserve accumulation has been attributed 
to the self-insurance or precautionary demand. Foreign exchange reserves can reduce the 
probability of an output drop induced by capital flight or sudden stop. This self-insurance 
motivation rose substantially in the wake of the East Asian crises; this point was verified by 
Aizenman and Marion (2003).10 Aizenman and Lee (2007) evaluated the relative importance of 
these of the various motivations by augmenting the conventional specifications for reserve 
holdings with proxy variables associated with the mercantilism and self-insurance/precautionary 
demand approaches. While variables associated with both approaches are statistically significant, 
the self-insurance variables play a greater economic role in accounting for recent trends.  
The “global saving glut” explanation has been expounded by Bernanke (2005), Clarida 
(2005a,b), and Hubbard (2005). This argument views excess saving from Asian emerging market 
countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis (and to a lesser extent Europe), as the cause of the U.S. current account deficit. More 
recently, the burgeoning surpluses of the oil exporters, ranging from the Persian Gulf countries to 
Russia, have moved to the fore as sources of excess saving. From this perspective, the U.S. 
external imbalance is a problem made abroad; the lack of well-developed and open financial 
markets encourages countries with excess savings to seek financial intermediation in well-
developed financial systems such as the United States. Hence, a solution may only arise in the 
longer term, as better developed financial systems mitigate this excess savings problem. 
Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) model the saving glut explanation as a shortage of assets 
in the developing world. Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull model financial development as the 
increase in the degree of enforcement of financial contracts. 
The strongest point in favor of the saving glut hypothesis is the observation of a widening 
current account deficit in the United States, combined with low real world interest rates. 
However, the saving glut versus twin deficits view is not an either-or proposition. An 
                                                 
10 See also Aizenman and Lee (2007), and Jeanne and Ranciere (2005). 
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expansionary fiscal policy in the United States, combined with an investment drought in East 
Asia would yield the observed increase in current account imbalances, while at the same time 
resulting in a drop in the real interest rate. Thus, a simple open economy macro model can 
explain the recent rise in U.S. current account deficits, East Asian current account surpluses, and 
the recent fall in global interest rates without resort to exotic demand for high quality assets, or 
the like.  
In order to formally test the saving glut hypothesis, one can evaluate whether financial 
development and institutional development explain the pattern of imbalances.  
Using a structural model while controlling for the level of financial development and 
openness as well as institutional development, Chinn and Ito (2007) provide evidence against the 
argument that emerging market countries, especially those in East Asia, will experience lower 
rates of saving once these countries achieve higher levels of financial development and better 
developed legal infrastructure. In addition, more open financial markets do not appear to have 
any impact on current account balances for this group of countries. 
Ito and Chinn (2009) examine whether their results are sensitive to the use of alternative 
indicators of financial development, namely measures of equity, bond, and insurance market 
activity, as well as different aspects of financial development such as the cost performance, size, 
and activeness of the industry. They find that credit to the private sector and stock market 
capitalization appear to be equally important determinants of current account behavior. While 
increases in the size of financial markets induce a decline in the current account balance in 
industrial countries, the reverse is more often the case for developing countries, especially when 
other measures of financial development are included. They also find that a greater degree of 
financial openness is typically associated with a smaller current account balance in developing 
countries. 
 On the other hand, in the Chinn and Ito papers, typically both the US current account 
deficit as well as the Chinese current account surplus were underpredicted. Hence, considerable 
gaps in our understanding of the origins of global imbalances remain.  
 Finally, we may apply the view of distortions in the financial market as one of the main 
causes of the global imbalances. In the context of the developing world, this view can be akin to 
or combined with the saving glut hypothesis. That is, financial market distortions in the 
developing world led countries to hold an excessive amount of national saving, which can be a 
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push factor for excess saving to flow to other countries with more developed financial markets. 
At the same time, financial distortions in the developed world can be a pull factor; financial 
distortions can cause irrational asset booms and pulled those flows from developing countries 
with excess savings to countries with institutional developed and open financial markets such as 
the United States. 
 With these push and full factors existent, risk can be underpriced. In such an environment, 
the reversed capital flows from developing to developed world – the Lucas paradox – can be 
long-lasting while both worlds appear to be mutually dependent and beneficial on the surface, 
until the bust of the cycle breaks out.  
Irrationality, or waves of excess optimism and pessimism, is stressed by Akerlof and 
Shiller (2009). Stiglitz (2010) stresses the credit market imperfections associated with 
asymmetric information. Rent seeking and regulatory capture dominate the discussion by 
Johnson and Kwak (2010). Interestingly, excess saving from East Asia does not appear as a 
causal factor in any of these accounts. Roubini and Mihm (2010: 80-82) and Chinn and Frieden 
(2009; forthcoming) argue that excess rest-of-world saving combined with domestic financial 
distortions were central to the development and extent of the crisis. 
The Chinn-Frieden interpretation is consistent with the view that a resumption of 
expanding imbalances without dealing with the distortions in credit markets would cause a 
repetition, albeit some other form. While the US has begun addressing some of those market 
distortions in the form of a comprehensive financial regulation package, much of the actual 
regulation remains to be implemented. Even then, it is unlikely that the financial reforms will do 
more than moderate the distortions. This reality suggests that policies that mitigate current 
account balances (in either direct) warrant consideration as second-best alternatives. 
 
3. Empirics 
In this section we estimate a simple analytical model of current account balances as well 
as national saving and investment.  In doing so we build on the work of Chinn and Prasad (2003) 
and Chinn and Ito (2007) and will estimate the following two models.  
 
Model 1: 
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yi,t refers to three dependent variables: the current account balance, national saving, and 
investment, all expressed as a share of GDP. BB is the government budget balance,  FD is a 
measure of financial development, for which private credit creation (PCGDP) is usually used; 
KAOPEN, the Chinn-Ito (2006) measure of financial openness; and LEGAL a measure of 
legal/institutional development – the first principal component of law and order (LAO), 
bureaucratic quality (BQ), and anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT).11 Xi,t is a vector of 
macroeconomic and policy control variables that include familiar determinants current account 
balances such as net foreign assets as a ratio to GDP; relative income (to the U.S.); its quadratic 
term; relative dependency ratios on young and old population; terms of trade volatility; output 
growth rates; trade openness (= exports+imports/GDP); dummies for oil exporting countries; and 
time fixed effects.  
Panels of non-overlapping 5-year averages are used for all explanatory variables except 
when noted otherwise. All the variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into 
the deviations from their GDP-weighted world mean prior to the calculation of five year 
averages – net foreign asset ratios are sampled from the first year of each five-year panel as the 
initial conditions.12 The data are mostly extracted from publicly available datasets such as the 
World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, and World Economic Outlook 
(for details see the appendix). 
                                                 
11 LAO, BQ, and CORRUPT are extracted from the ICRG database. Higher values of these variables indicate better 
conditions. 
12 The variables for ToT volatility (TOT), trade openness (OPN), and legal development (LEGAL) are averaged for 
each country, i.e., they are time-invariant. 
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The original annual data include 23 industrial and 86 developing countries covering the 
four decades 1970-2008.13 We regress current account balances, national saving, and investment 
on the same set of regressors separately for industrialized countries (IDC), developing countries 
(LDC) and emerging market economies (EMG).14 
 
3.1 Baseline Results 
Table 1 shows the results for Model 1.  Note first that these are consistent with the twin 
deficits hypothesis: budget surpluses and current account surpluses move together, other things 
equal.  A coefficient of less than one suggests however that they move together less than 
proportionately.15  Larger net foreign assets, which should generate a stronger income account, 
affect the current account balance positively, as anticipated.  The relative income terms, which 
tend to be jointly if not always individuallly significant, show that higher income countries 
generally have stronger current accounts (“capital tends to flow from higher to lower income 
countries”).  Countries with higher dependency ratios (and, by the life-cycle hypothesis, lower 
savings rates) generally have weaker current accounts.16  Oil exporting countries have stronger 
current accounts, other things equal.  All this is as expected.  
The Caballero-Farhi-Gourinchas (2008) hypothesis that countries with more developed 
financial markets should have weaker currents accounts (“capital flows from China, with its 
underdeveloped capital markets, to the United States, which has a comparative advantage in 
producing safe financial assets”) finds weak support in the full sample (left-most column).17  The 
pattern is the same but the significance of the effect vanishes when we disaggregate industrial 
and developing countries.  This is perhaps not surprising, in that the hypothesis in question 
emphasizes flows between industrial and developing countries, not among members of the two 
subgroups. 
                                                 
13 The five year panels are 1971-75, 1976-1980, etc. However, the last panel is composed of only three years: 2006-
08. We can consider the last panel as the years of the global imbalances. 
14 The emerging market economies are defined as the economies classified as either emerging or frontier during 
1980–1997 by the International Financial Corporation, plus Hong Kong and Singapore. 
15 These estimates are very similar to those in Abbas et al. (2010), who find that the elasticity of the current account 
balance with respect to the fiscal balance is on the order of 0.2-0.3. Erceg et al. (2005) also show their simulation 
results yield the coefficient of the budget balance to be around 0.20. 
16 Although this result does not show up for the industrial countries. 
17 The p-value is 15%. 
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 Two dummy variables for the 2001-5 and 2006-8 subperiods look to the question of 
whether recent experience has been unusual.18  Emerging market economies appear to have run 
unusually large surpluses in the first subperiod, consistent with the idea that they were fixated on 
minimizing financing vulnerabilities and accumulating reserves following the Asian crisis.  Such 
behavior is not evident for emerging markets as a group in 2006-8, when the contribution of 
emerging markets to global imbalances was increasingly a China story.19  A surprise is that we 
see the industrial countries as a group running larger surpluses in the same 2001-5 period than 
their other characteristics would lead one to expect.  Evidently the United States was an outlier in 
this respect.20   
 Table 2-1 add the institutional variables.  The principal result of interest is the coefficient 
on the interaction between capital account openness and financial development (together with the 
financial-development effect discussed above).  For the full sample and the IDC and EMG 
subsamples, the results are again supportive of the Caballero et al. interpretation of global 
imbalances with statistically significant coefficients.  Among emerging markets, those with 
better developed financial markets and open capital accounts similarly have weaker current 
account balances, as if they are on the receiving end of inflows (or experience the least tendency 
for capital to flow out).  Also, consistently with the saving glut hypothesis, further financial 
deepening coupled with higher levels of legal development would worsen current account 
balances. When we look only at the industrial countries, however, these patterns are no longer 
evident.  
Table 2-2 then estimates the model for savings and investment separately.  A few results 
of note are that government budget deficits affect primarily national saving (in the same direction 
as government saving, contrary to Ricardian equivalence stories), that dependency ratios affect 
both savings and investment (as emphasized in Eichengreen and Fifer 2002).21 As the saving glut 
                                                 
18 Time fixed effects for all the five-year periods (except for the first five-year period) are included in the estimation, 
but only those for the 2001-05 and 2006-08 periods are reported in the table. 
19 We can confirm this by adding a dummy variable for China in the post-2005 period.  Its coefficient is positive and 
significant at the one per cent level, while the coefficient for emerging markets as a group in this subperiod 
continues to be zero. 
20 We can confirm this by adding a dummy variable for the U.S. in the 2001-5 subperiod; its coefficient is negative, 
and adding it does not eliminates the significant positive coefficient for 2001-5 in the industrial-country column.  
Not surprisingly, when we include all countries (in the left-most column), these period dummy variables are 
insignificant, since by definition current accounts should sum to zero. 
21 The Ricardian hypothesis predicts that any change in public saving would be offset by the exact same change but 
with the opposite sign in private saving, thus making the estimated coefficient of budget balances zero. The 
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proponents argue, further financial development would lessen the need for precautionary saving. 
If a country is equipped with better-developed legal systems, the negative impact of financial 
development on national saving can be even larger. Financial development has a more consistent 
impact on investment than saving (something that would not be obvious a priori).  A number of 
other variables that do not appear to have a significant impact on the current account balance in 
Table 1 or Table 2-1, such as growth, trade openness and terms-of-trade volatility, nonetheless 
affect both savings and investment significantly; they just affect them in the same direction. 
 
3.2 Further Investigation on the Analysis on Current Account Balances – Contributions of 
the Determinants 
 To examine what may have contributed to the global imbalances, we need to have a more 
in-depth analysis on how the determinants of current accounts contributed to the rise and fall of 
the balances. As we discussed in Section 2, there are competing, but not mutually exclusive, 
hypotheses that identify important factors to current account balances. The estimation from the 
previous section allows us to observe how the contributions of the explanatory variables have 
evolved over time.  
 Figure 3 illustrates, for several selected countries, the actual contributions of the factors 
of our interest (i.e., ii x̂ ) to current account balances using the estimates from the regression 
analysis we reported in Table 2.22 While we have a large number of explanatory variables, we 
want to focus on several variables to compare the competing hypotheses. Therefore, we group 
some of the contributions of the variables of our interest. More specifically, we group the 
estimated contributions of financial development, legal development, financial openness, and 
their three interactions into one group, and call it the contribution of the “saving glut” group of 
variables. We also group the contributions of young and old dependencies into the 
“demography” group. Besides these two groups, we show the estimated contributions of budget 
balances and net foreign assets. The other factors are lumped into the “Others” group. The 
figures in the left column illustrate the contributions of factors to the levels of current account 
balances. Those in the right column on the other hand illustrate the contributions to the changes 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ricardian framework can be extended to predict public dissaving would not crowd out private investment, thus 
making public saving and investment uncorrelated. 
22 The contributions are calculated using the estimation results for the subgroup of countries the concerned country 
belongs to. 
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in the current account balances of the changes in the factors, or the groups thereof, of our interest. 
By construction, the sum of all the four bars should add up to the predicted values, or changes in 
the predicted values (the dotted line with the square nodes). Comparing these bars with the actual 
current account balances, or changes in current account balances (the solid line with the diamond 
nodes), should give us some inferences about what factors have contributed to the current 
account balances or their changes and allow us to compare the different hypotheses we discussed 
in the previous section. 
 We can make several observations from the graphs. First, while the contributions of 
budget balances and net foreign assets have varied over time, those of the “saving glut variables” 
and “demography” tend to be stable. Second, the contribution of the demographical factors tends 
to be large for industrialized countries, but that is not the case for emerging market economies. 
Third, for the United States and the United Kingdom, although the level of budget balances does 
not seem to be a big contributor, the changes in the balance appear to be more correlated with the 
changes in the current account balances, suggesting that changes in budget balances contribute to 
guiding the direction of current account balances. Fourth, the group of the “saving glut variables” 
has been contributing to improving current accounts for emerging market countries, but its effect 
has been relatively stable, not just a recent phenomenon. 
These observations are confirmed in Table 3 which show the beta coefficients for the 
estimation originally shown in Table 2-1. The estimates in this table should be interpreted as 
showing by how many standard deviations the dependent variable, i.e., current account balances 
(as % of GDP), should move if one of the explanatory variable moves by one standard deviation 
ceteris paribus. The beta coefficients are often used as measures to show the level of relative 
importance among the explanatory variables. According to Table 3, budget balances, net foreign 
asset, and old dependency ratios affect the variation of current account balances for the sample 
countries. The saving glut variables are found to have more influence on the variation of current 
account balances for the industrial countries, but not necessarily in line with the prediction of the 
saving glut hypothesis. While the levels of legal development or financial openness is an 
important determinant for the less developing countries, the interactions between financial and 
legal development or between financial development and  openness are important for emerging 
market countries in a way consistent with the saving glut hypothesis. However, the magnitude of 
contribution is not great. 
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3.3 Other Potential Determinants of the Current Accounts? 
3.3.1 Financial Booms and ‘Leveraging’ as Contributors to Current Account Balances 
 While we had an extensive set of explanatory variables to investigate the determinants of 
the current account balances, our estimation model may not have exhausted a list of candidate 
determinants, especially in terms of explaining the peculiar period of global imbalances. As we 
have discussed already, one potential contributor to the peculiarity is the booming financial 
markets in the 2000s. In the period prior to the financial crisis of 2008-09, households in many 
advanced economies, most notably the United States, borrowed money robustly, fueling 
domestic absorption. While we can count a number of factors such as low interest rates, lax 
standards for bank lending, a global-scale expansion of exotic mortgage products and securitized 
loans as the determinants of strong growth in household borrowing and consumption, many of 
these factors are difficult to measure in a way that can be incorporated into a cross-country 
empirical analysis.  
 Nonetheless, we can investigate whether and to what extent financial exuberance may 
have had an impact on the current account by incorporating the level of ‘leverage’ by households 
into our analysis. Here, we define leverage as the ratio of debt to household disposable income. 
Using the OECD database, we have HH-Leverage 1, which is the growth rate of the ratio of 
household debt (‘general loans’) to disposable income as the general measure for the growth in 
household leverage. We also have HH-Leverage 2, that is the growth rate of the ratio of 
household mortgage debt to disposable income. As a comparison, we also construct G-Leverage, 
that is the growth rate of the ratio of government debt to government revenue as the measure of 
government leverage. While G-Leverage is available for most of OECD countries since the early 
1970s, HH-Leverage 1 and HH-Leverage 2 are quite limited, available for a smaller number of 
OECD countries only after 1995.23 
 Figure 4 illustrates the development of the growth rates of these leverage measures.24 In 
panels (a) through (c), we can see that countries did experience high growth in leveraging in the 
years leading up to the crisis of 2008-09. The growth rates are especially higher when we 
                                                 
23 G-Leverage, HH-Leverage 1, and HH-Leverage 2 are available for the maximal of 30, 27, and 16 countries, 
respectively, though the availabilities are mostly concentrated in recent years. 
24 In the OECD database, the level of household disposable income is not available, but the annual growth rate is 
available. Hence, we calculate the growth rate of household leverage measures as the growth rate of household debt, 
either general or home mortgage, minus the growth rate of household disposable income. 
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measure the level of leveraging using the mortgage loan debt as we discuss anecdotally. We 
cannot discern any regularity in government’s leveraging. However, it seems that the level of 
leveraging declined in several years leading to the crisis period.  
 We now include these variables in our estimation and report the results in Table 4.  We 
must note that the data availability of the leverage measures restrict our sample. The estimations 
are now run only for the OECD countries, and those with either HH-Leverage 1 or HH-Leverage 
2 cover data from 1996 on, i.e., the last three five-year panels, 1996-2000, 2001-05, and 2006-08. 
The estimations with G-Leverage include more panels (starting in 1971), but the sample is 
limited in earlier panels.25 
 Table 4 shows that higher growth in the level of general household leverage leads to 
worsening of the current account as we expect. A one percentage point increase in the growth 
rate of household leveraging leads to a 0.25 percentage point decrease in the current account 
balance. However, when we measure household leverage focusing on home mortgage, we do not 
see any significant negative impact on the current account. In column (3), we also see that the 
government’s taking more leverage can lead to worsening current account balances, again 
consistent with theoretical prediction. When we include both HH-Leverage 1 and G-Leverage, 
however, the impact of G-Leverage now becomes positive. Given that the coefficient of HH-
Leverage 1 remains negative with even greater magnitude and statistical significance, and also 
that the simple correlation between HH-Leverage 1 and G-Leverage is found to be quite low, the 
positive coefficient of G-Leverage should not be driven by multicollinearity.  We interpret the 
result as being driven by greater government debt accumulation in the slowdown.26 
 Given the extent of global imbalances and financial boom experienced in the 2006-08 
period, we also seek to identify any evidence for a heightened effect of leveraging. To that end, 
we include interaction terms between the fixed effect for the 2006-08 period and the leverage 
variables and report the right half of Table 4. In the model that includes both HH-Leverage 1 and 
G-Leverage and their interactions with the 2006-08 period dummy, we see evidence that the 
growth in household leveraging has a particularly higher impact on the current account in 2006-
08. There seems to be an additional impact of household leveraging in terms of mortgages in the 
                                                 
25 Since Japan appears to be an outlier for its high growth in public leverage (G-Leverage), we remove the country’s 
effect by interacting G-Leverage with a dummy for Japan. But we do not report the estimate in the table, which is 
often found to be significantly positive. 
26 When we use the government leverage variable calculated using the data on government debt and revenue from 
IMF’s WEO, the results are unchanged although the number of observations increases significantly. 
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2006-08 period, but it is not statistically significant. We also see the impact of government 
leveraging is particularly high in the 2006-08 period as well.  
   
3.3.2 Foreign Reserves Accumulation? 
 Another variable one may be interested in as a contributor to current account balances is 
international reserves holding. Most of large international reserve holders run current account 
surpluses constantly as we see among East Asian countries and oil exporting countries. As we 
have seen previously, the Bretton Woods II argument by Dooley et al. focuses on the link 
between international reserves holding and continuous current account surpluses. However, it is 
difficult to examine the impact of international reserve holding on current account balances 
because the current account balance and contemporaneous reserves are simultaneously 
determined – positive shocks to the current account will translate into positive shocks to reserves.  
 Hence, we include in our estimation foreign reserves as a percent of GDP, lagged one 
five-year period, as an additional explanatory variable27 28 Our presumption is that, other things 
equal, larger reserves from the previous period – that can also represent the past tendency of 
international reserves holding – should mean less incentive for reserve accumulation and a 
weaker current account.  For the industrial countries, the coefficient on this variable is negative 
and significant, as hypothesized.  For emerging market economies, it is insignificant.  For 
developing countries, it is positive and significant, contrary to the hypothesis.29  
 
3.3.3 Is It an East Asian or U.S. Phenomenon? Or Both? 
 As was in the case of international reserves, some of the competing hypotheses for the 
global imbalances unsurprisingly focuses on socio-economic, institutional, or geographical 
characteristics of the countries that have run persistent current account imbalances such as East 
Asian countries and the United States. Capital flows can be affected by some externality in 
geographical regions as well as political or geopolitical roles of the countries, but these factors 
may be not fully represented by the explanatory variables.  
 In fact, if we include the dummies for the United State, China, or other East Asian 
emerging market countries in our basic estimation model using the full sample, these dummies 
                                                 
27 Results not shown in the table. 
28 Gagnon (2011) argues that the change in the foreign exchange reserves should be included. 
29 These estimates are based on model 2 including the institutional variables. 
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turn out to be significant.30 The dummy for the United States is found to be -3.5% whereas the 
ones for China and ex-China East Asian emerging countries are +3.3% and +2.4%, respectively 
(not reported). These results suggest that there can be unobservable factors contributing to the 
determination of current account balances.  
We then ask whether the country- or country-group- specific factors are stable over time 
by allowing the dummies for the U.S. and East Asian emerging markets to vary over 5-year 
panels. Figure 5 shows the estimates of the interaction terms between the dummies for the U.S., 
China, and ex-China East Asian emerging countries and fixed effects for the five-year panels in 
the full sample estimation. In the figure, we report insignificant estimates as zeros.31 We can see 
that the “U.S. effect” is relatively stable, though ranging between -2.0 to over -6.0%. This is 
consistent with the view that the U.S. has some special characteristic allowing it to run persistent 
current account deficits of some 3 per cent of GDP on average, presumably as a result of its 
status as the issuer of the international vehicle currency.32  
The “ex-China East Asian” or “China” effect is, on the other hand, not stable over time 
the effect for the East Asian emerging market countries is evident only after the Asian crisis of 
1997-98, reflecting the investment drought in the post-crisis period (Chinn and Ito, 2007). 
Considering that “excess” current surplus is more of a recent phenomena despite the long-time 
focus on export-led industrial policy, it is difficult to argue that the main cause for these 
countries’ persistent current account surplus is due to their mercantilism motives.  
The same argument applies to China. While there are some time periods when China’s 
current account balances are higher than model predictions, it is noteworthy that its current 
account surplus is especially high in the global imbalances period, marking the level of excess 
surplus as high as 7% of GDP. 
 
4. Are the Current Account Balances Atypical in the 2006-08 Period? 
The observations from the last section suggests the possibility that current accounts may 
have behaved atypically in the 2006-08 period, which is the global imbalances period prior to the 
global crisis. Figure 6 displays the implied current account balances for several countries along 
with 95% confidence intervals of prediction that are calculated using the estimation results 
                                                 
30 “East Asian emerging market countries” include China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
31 We use the estimation model with institutional variables (Model 2). 
32 See Gourinchas and Rey (2007). 
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shown in Table 2.33 The figure shows that the U.S. current account deviated from the predicted 
path significantly in the 1996-2000 and 2001-05 periods though it falls back in the 95% 
confidence interval in the last period. Germany’s and China’s current accounts are well outside 
the confidence interval. These results suggest the possibility of missing variables that are not 
captured by the estimation model as far as the last period is concerned. 
Let us take a look at the distribution of the prediction errors from the estimation model to 
see how well the estimation model explains the variations of current account balances in 
different time periods. In Figure 7, the Kernel density estimates of the distribution of the 
prediction errors from Model 2 (Table 2-1) are presented for different sample groups and 
different time periods. Interestingly, for the full sample and the LDC and EMG subsamples, the 
distribution of the prediction errors from the baseline estimation has become significantly wider 
in the 2006-08 period.34 For the group of industrialized countries, the prediction errors are more 
skewed to the left and more widely distributed widely distributed in 2006-08, but wide variation 
of the prediction errors appears also in the 1980s and the 1990s besides the last period.  
In sum, our estimation model does not seem to predict well the current account series in 
the 2006-08 period for developing countries, especially those with emerging markets, and to a 
lesser extent the same conclusion can be made for the group of industrial countries, suggesting a 
possibility of a regime shift in the current account balance series in this period. 
 
4.1 Identifying Structural Breaks 
With a suspicion of a structural break in the current account behavior in the period 
immediately before the global crisis, we conduct further analysis to confirm the structural break. 
Here, we make out-of-sample predictions retroactively and recursively and estimate the 
probabilities of actual current account balances compared to the distributions of predicted levels 
of current account so as to examine whether the realized current account balances were 
“surprises” or not. More specifically, we first make the forecasts of current account balances for 
the 2006-08 period using data through 2005. We then calculate the confidence intervals of the 
                                                 
33 We continue to use Model 2 (Table 2-1) that includes institutional variables and their interactions. 
34 The unstable distribution of prediction errors is consistent with our use of heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors. 
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(retroactive) forecasts, which we call the “pseudo-confidence intervals of forecast”.35 With the 
pseudo-confidence intervals of forecast, we can estimate the probability of an actual, or realized, 
value of current accounts by calculating how many standard deviations the realized value of 
current accounts is away from the “forecasted” value. The number of standard deviations 
corresponds to the t-statistics (adjusted for the degrees of freedom), and gives us the p-value of 
the realized current account balancing occurring.  
Figure 8 shows the “forecasting” exercise for the 2006-08 period for Germany. The 
realized current account balance for the country is very close to the upper limit of the 90% 
pseudo-confidence interval. Hence, we can suspect that, based on the estimation that uses data up 
to 2005, the probability of such a level of current account balance occurring is close to 5%. In 
fact, the p-value is found to be 7.6%. We repeat this exercise and retroactively forecast the 
current account balance for the 2001-05 period using the data up to 2000 (Panel (b) of Figure 8). 
We recursively and retroactively conduct the out-of-sample predictions back to the 1991-95 
period and estimate the probabilities for realized current account balances.36 
Table 5 reports the out-of-sample prediction errors and the estimated p-values for our 
samples of industrialized and emerging market countries. For example, we can see that, for the 
United States, the probability of the level of current account balance in the 2006-08 period is 
18.4% based on the estimation with the data up to 2005 and the probability of the level of current 
account balance in 2001-05 is 19.4% based on the estimation with the data up to 2000. These p-
                                                 
35 We need to be careful about the distinction between the “confidence intervals of predictions” and the “confidence 
intervals of forecasts.” The former is literally the confidence intervals of predicted values, or the conditional mean of 
y (i.e., ŷ ) given a set of regressors xi’s. The confidence interval of predictions reflects the uncertainty of the 
estimated coefficients (captured by the confidence intervals of b̂  in bX ˆ' ). The “confidence intervals of forecasts” 
are the confidence intervals for the unknown values of y for a known set of xi’s. Hence, this type of confidence 
intervals reflect not only the uncertainty of the estimated coefficients, but also the distribution of prediction errors. 
In other words, the “confidence intervals of forecasts” are constructed by using the )var()ˆvar()var( iii yy  , 
which is the sum of the variance of predictions and that of the errors. For the variance of the errors, the standard 
errors of regressions (SER) are normally used in the estimation that assumes homoskedasticity. In our estimation, 
however, we allow for heteroskedasticity, and thereby cannot use the SER. Hence, we instead use the standard 
deviations of the prediction errors from the last five-year period before the forecasted period. Because we make 
forecasts retroactively for the past periods and because we make modifications for the variance of the prediction 
errors (instead of using SER), we call our confidence intervals of forecast the “pseudo-confidence intervals of 
forecast.” 
36 One could argue that as the out-of-sample predictions proceed to earlier periods, the degree of freedoms would 
decline, so could the accuracy of the predictions. However, the pseudo-confidence intervals should reflect the 
decline in the accuracy of the predictions with greater standard deviations of prediction errors prior to the forecasted 
period and thereby with wider pseudo-confidence intervals. Hence, the p-values are still comparable across different 
time periods. 
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values can be interpreted as the measure that represents the extent of “surprise.” The smaller the 
p-value is, to the higher extent the realized current account balance is perceived as a surprise.37 
In the table, the p-values in bold indicate the p-values below 5%. The lowest p-values across 
different time periods should indicate the “most surprising” current account balances. If most 
countries experience the “most surprising” current accounts in one period, that period can be 
interpreted as a structural break.  
The tables show that the average probabilities are the lowest in 1996-2000 for IDC and 
2006-08 for EMG. That is, on average, the level of current account balances was most surprising 
in 1996-2000 for IDC and in 2006-08 for EMG. Also, the number of countries with the p-value 
below 5% (“surprises”) is the highest in 1996-2000 for IDC (six countries) and 2006-08 for 
EMG (10). Furthermore, nine industrial countries which have the lowest p-values (“most 
surprising”) in 2006-08 while 21 EMGs also have the lowest p-values in the same period. Given 
the lowest subsample average of the p-values, and that a large number of countries have the 
surprising level of p-values, we can conclude that emerging market countries have experienced a 
structural break in 2000-06. For the industrialized countries, there are more indications that the 
structural break may have occurred in the 1996-2000 period, but given the low level of p-values, 
the 2006-08 period may not be ruled out as a structural break point.  
 
4.2 What Happened in 2006-08?  
We focus on the 2006-08 period since we found it to be the structural break point 
strongly for emerging market countries and to a lesser degree for industrialized countries. Given 
the debates on the link between the global imbalances and the global crisis, it is reasonable to 
focus on this time period. 
The results from the previous subsection indicate that there may be some factors that are 
not captured by the estimation model, and which may have helped current account balances in 
the period turned out to be significantly different from what could have been predicted. Table 5 
and Figure 9 show that the out-of-sample prediction errors for this period (using the data up to 
2005) vary widely across countries. We will further investigate what factors contributed to the 
unexplainable component of the current account balances of our sample countries.  
                                                 
37 Because the prediction must either over- or under-predict the actual current account balance, the highest 
probability is 50%. 
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We can think of several candidate factors that may have contributed to the unexplainable 
component of current account balances. Before the global crisis, financial markets were 
experiencing the “irrational exuberance.” While we include PCGDP in the estimation, this 
variable may not capture the robustness of the financial markets, but it would rather merely 
proxy for the extent of financial development. Some variables that represent exuberant financial 
markets may explain the unexplainable component of current accounts.  
The recent pile-up of international reserves by emerging market countries has to led 
many researchers to examine the determinants and the effects of international reserves holding. 
Some researchers focus on the mercantilist motive for holding international reserves (such as 
Aizenman and Marion, 2007). It is worthwhile of examining whether and to what extent 
international reserves holding affects the unexplainable part of current account balances in the 
period.  
Monetary policy may have contributed to the imbalances of current accounts through 
stimulating absorption. Some researchers (such as Taylor, 2009) argue that the Fed maintained 
lax monetary policy for too long, thereby keeping the cost of capital too low and feeding 
speculative investment in real assets. By the same token, fiscal policy should be suspected as one 
of the contributors. However, since budget balances are already included in the original 
estimation model, we suspect whether the extent of procyclicality matters for current account 
balances.  
Although Chinn and Wei (2009) show that the exchange rate regime does not affect the 
current account adjustment, it has been anecdotally argued that the type of the exchange rate 
regime affects the behavior of current accounts.  
Lastly, we also investigate whether the performance of housing markets affects the 
current account balances. One may need to be careful about this factor since it is probably the 
least exogenous factor among the ones we have talked about. To much extent, the performance 
of housing markets is the outcome of monetary policy, financial regulations, and other 
macroeconomic and institutional factors. In fact, we have already investigated the impact of 
leveraging on current account balances in a previous subsection. However, although we do find 
that general household leveraging leads to worsening current account balances, we do not find 
any evidence for mortgage leveraging affecting current account balances. It is possible that rising 
housing prices may have caused wealth effect and consequently contributed to increasing 
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domestic absorption. As many researchers have focused on the impact of the housing markets on 
current account balances (such as Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009 and Fratzscher and Straub, 2009), 
asset market booms can attract capital inflows, thus worsening current account balances, through 
increasing perceived levels of wealth.  
Figure 10 illustrates scatter plots for the prediction errors and several variables of our 
interest, focusing the financial booming period. It appears that both real appreciation rate of 
housing prices and the growth rate of private bond market capitalization in the pre-crisis period 
of 2002-06 are negatively correlated with the prediction errors of current account balances. 
However, we cannot discern any (unconditional) correlations for stock market total values or 
public bond market capitalization.  
We surely need to control for other conditions. Hence, we run the following estimation 
equation: 
 
tiitit DWu  ˆ  .     (3) 
 
itû  is the out-of-sample prediction errors from the estimation for the 2006-08 period with Model 
2 for different subsamples. Wit is a vector of candidate variables that may explain the 
unexplainable component of current account balances. More specifically, it includes the 
following variables: 
 Average change in stock market total value (SMTV) in 2002-06;38 
 Average change in public bond market capitalization (PBBM) and private bond market 
capitalization (PBBM) in 2002-06; 
 Fiscal procyclicality – the correlations between Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-detrended 
government spending series and HP-detrended real GDP series in 2006-08 (FIS_PRO); 
 Dummy for the fixed exchange rate regime (FIX) in 2006-08 – assigned the value of 1 if 
a country is categorized as the fixed exchange regime in the Rogoff-Reinhart exchange 
rate regime index (2008), zero, otherwise;39 
                                                 
38 While the stock market capitalization variable (SMKC) represents the level of stock market development in terms 
of the size (or depth), SMTV or stock market turnovers (SMTO) can be a measure of the activeness of stock markets. 
Both SMKC and SMTO are found to be consistently insignificant, and therefore, dropped from the estimation. 
39 The most frequent type of the exchange rate regime is chosen for the 2006-08 period. The type of the exchange 
rate regime is based on the “coarse version” of the Rogoff-Reinhart exchange rate regime index. 
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 International reserves as a ratio to GDP (IR) as of 2005; 
 Real interest rate (Real_Int) – Lending rate minus the rate of inflation based on GDP 
deflators as of 2005; 
 Average of the real housing appreciation (the growth rates of housing indexes adjusted 
for CPI-inflation) in 2002-06. 40 
Di is also included in the estimation to examine whether there are any country-specific 
effects for the countries that have experienced notable current account imbalances. We run the 
estimation as specified in equation (3) and report the results in Table 6. Since the number of 
observations is small – both private/public bond market capitalization variables and the housing 
price indexes are quite restrictive especially for non-industrial countries, we lump both 
industrialized and emerging market countries into one sample. Despite the small number of 
observations that makes us a little cautious about interpretation, we have some interesting results. 
As one can expect, the performance of stock markets tends to worsen current account 
balances in the global imbalances period, though the level of statistical significance can differ 
across different models. Private and bond market performances do also seem to affect current 
account balances in this period. In sum, better performance in the financial markets appear to 
have contributed to more capital inflows, thus worsening current account balances in the global 
imbalances period. Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow us to identify what type 
of financial market performance most affects the unusual performance of current account 
balances in this period. But given that the variable for the growth in stock market total values is 
more significant in the models that include the country dummies (with significant coefficients), 
we may conclude that stock market performance affects the unusual current account balances in 
the pre-crisis period. While fiscal procyclicality does not seem to affect the unexplainable 
component of current account balances, there is some evidence that monetary policy matters for 
current account balances. In the models that include the housing index, the real interest rates as 
of 2005 are found to be a negative contributor to the unexplainable part of current account 
balances despite the significant entry of the real housing appreciation variable. As was shown in 
                                                 
40 We collected housing indexes for as many countries as possible, using the CEIC database, government statistical 
agencies, and other private organizations that keep track on housing prices. For several countries, we use the data 
provided by Joshua Aizenman and Yothin Jinjarak. The original data are available for 47 countries. While data 
availability varies widely among countries, the data for most of the countries are available after 1990. For this 
exercise, the average real growth rate of the housing indexes for the 2002-06 period is included. The choice of the 
period is driven by the facts that the last world recession occurred in 2001; the housing bubble peaked in 2006. 
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Figure 10, real housing appreciation does negatively affect the unexplainable component of 
current account balances. Consistently with Aizenman and Jinjarak, we can conclude that asset 
market boom tends to attract capital inflows. Despite much attention paid to the recent, rapid 
accumulation of international reserves, international reserves do not seem to contribute to the 
unexplainable component of current account balances. 41 
Despite all these explanatory variables, there is still an unexplainable component of 
current accounts for several countries with large current account imbalances, namely, the United 
States, China, Greece, and Iceland. This result may indicate that these countries need to 
implement policies that are particularly tailored for their country-specific situations that affect 
the saving and investment decisions. 
 
5. Forecasting Current Account Balances 
5.1 Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16 
Let us turn our attention to the future. We now use these estimated relationships to 
forecast the prospects for global rebalancing. We construct forecasts of the independent variables 
out to the 2012-16 period and use our estimates from our baseline model to project values for the 
current account.  The forecasts start with 2012, omitting the crisis years 2009-11, when behavior 
was unusual. The assumptions and the data for the out-of-sample projections are explained in 
Appendix 2.42 We make two types of forecasts: one type is the forecasts we make using data 
through 2008 and the other is the forecasts we make using data only through 2005. Given the 
possibility of a structural break in 2006, the forecasts made with data through 2005 can be 
interpreted as the projections of the current account countries may experience if their economic 
conditions revert to the pre-global imbalances period. Figure 11 presents forecasts of current 
account balances for several countries which either contributed to the global imbalances or are 
experiencing debt crisis (as of the fall of 2011). The forecasts made using data up to 2008 are 
shown in the red line and the forecasts made using data through 2005 are shown in the grey line. 
                                                 
41 We also repeat the same exercise, but in a panel context, by using the retroactive prediction errors from Table 5 as 
the dependent variables and having the explanatory variables of equation 3 as the five-year averages. The results 
from this exercise (not reported) yield consistent results with those reported in Table 6. However, it must be noted 
that the data availability of the housing prices as well as bond market capitalization variables restrict the size of the 
sample significantly, making it composed of data mostly from the 1990s and of industrialized and emerging market 
countries. 
42 We use model 2 (including the institutional variables) and the separate estimates for industrial and emerging-
market economies as the basis for our forecasts. 
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One standard deviation confidence intervals of forecast are also shown, that correspond to about 
65% of probability of occurrence. 
For the United States, the forecasts based on the data through 2008 in Figure 11 suggest 
its current account deficit stabilizes around 4% of GDP though the IMF projects it will 
significantly improve to 2%. The forecasts with the data through 2005 suggest even a 
deterioration of current accounts. However, although both models have the tendency of 
persistently underpredicting U.S. current account deficits, both of their predicted levels of 
current account balances end up getting close to the IMF projection.  
A similar observation can be made for the UK; in either U.S. or U.K. case, the narrowing 
of current account deficits over the period is more limited than the IMF projection. The news for 
the surplus industrial countries, namely Japan and Germany, is even less reassuring. The 
forecasts suggest that their surpluses will remain stable or even rise further, absent additional 
policy changes. However, again, the IMF projects there will be more rebalancing for these 
countries.43 Our model predict the European debt crisis countries will continue to run current 
account deficit, but the current debt crisis will probably cause these countries to experience 
rebalancing because of weakened demand by the crisis. Our results on leveraging may also fill 
the gap between the IMF projection and our prediction which does not incorporate 
leveraging/deleveraging effect. As we have been observing, the Euro crisis has led European 
countries to decrease their financial exposure; deleveraging is taking place on a large scale. If 
that is the case, current account deficit countries should experience an improvement in their 
current account balances as we found previously. Our results suggest that one percentage 
decrease in the growth rate of household leverage should lead to a 0.2  percentage point 
improvement in current account balances as the share of GDP.  
Among emerging market countries with current account surpluses, our model predicts 
their surpluses slightly rise or remain constant. If the “East Asian effect” we observed in Figure 5 
continues to exist, the relatively stable predictions of their current account surpluses would mean 
their surpluses would persist. One interpretation is that the circle will be squared by other 
countries that will run smaller surpluses and offset America’s smaller deficits. That can be also 
applicable to China, but even a significant reduction in the surplus as projected by the IMF will 
                                                 
43 Japan’s rebalancing can be due to the earthquake/nuclear crisis in March 2011 which the IMF must incorporate in 
its projection. 
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still leave the country with a high level of surplus. A less reassuring interpretation is that the 
parts do not add up under current forecasts and that even partial rebalancing, possibly caused by 
the Euro/debt, will require further policy changes. Either way, it seems clear that imbalances will 
persist. 
Table 7 reports the two types of forecasted current accounts for the countries for which 
the data are available to make forecasts, along with the 2006-08 level of current account balances 
and the IMF’s projection for the 2012-16 period. The table shows that the IMF projects a 
relatively high degree of rebalancing; it projects that the average current account surplus of the 
countries that ran current account surplus as of 2006-08 will shrink from 7.4% (as a share of 
GDP) to 5.7%. The average size of current account deficit is projected to improve significantly 
from -7.5% to -3.4%. The variation of current account balances is also expected to drop from 
10.2% to 5.4%.  
Our forecasts present a somewhat different picture depending on the data to use for the 
forecasts. When we base our projection on data through 2008, the extent of rebalancing does not 
seem to be as promising as the IMF’s projection. Our estimation using data up to 2008 
(“Forecasts (2008)”) predicts the degree of variation will drop by 3.2% (against the 4.8% drop of 
the IMF projection). The average size of current account surplus of the surplus countries will fall 
by 3.7% though we expect current account deficit improves by the same degree as the IMF 
projection. However, our forecasts based on data through 2005 suggest more rebalancing is on its 
way. The change in the extent of variation of current account balances is projected to drop by the 
same degree as the IMF’s projection (4.6%). The average size of surplus of the surplus countries 
is expected to shrink much more than that of deficit of the deficit countries (-6.6% for surplus 
countries vs. +2.9% for deficit countries) compared to the IMF projections.  
What do these results indicate? That our forecasts based on data through 2005 are closer 
to the IMF projection suggests that the IMF projection may be based on the assumption that 
countries will not revert to the economic situation that led to the unusual current account 
imbalances on the eve of the crisis. In other words, rebalancing of current accounts could only be 
achieved with the policies that would be more consistent with the economic environment of the 
pre-global imbalances period. However, it is also possible that the IMF projections incorporate 
more of what we do or cannot incorporate in our model, that is, the effect of Japan’s crisis and 
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the deterioration of the Euro debt crisis. These further suggest that unless countries implement 
drastic policy changes, the global imbalances may not disappear. 
 
5.2 What Would Fiscal Consolidation Do to the United States? 
One of the big issues of macroeconomic management in coming years will be fiscal 
consolidation. The industrial countries have been trying to reduce budget deficits without 
nipping the green shoots of recovery. How will global imbalances evolve under different fiscal 
scenarios? Figure 12 presents different out-of-sample predictions for U.S. current account 
balances in the 2012-16 period depending on the different scenarios about its budget balances – 
the baseline scenario based on the IMF WEO’s projections (see Appendix 2), an optimistic 
scenario, and a pessimistic scenario. The optimistic scenario is the case in which the average of 
the U.S. budget balances for the 2012-16 period turns out to be higher than the average based on 
WEO projection (-6.2% of GDP) by three percentage points.44 The pessimistic scenario is the 
case in which the 2012-16 average is lower than the WEO projection by three percentage points.  
Figure 12 shows that a 3 percentage point difference in the fiscal balance relative to the 
baseline scenario would change the current account balance by 70 basis points, i.e., about three 
quarters of one percentage point, suggesting that rebalancing cannot be accomplished through 
fiscal policy alone. If the shrinkage of budget deficits is coupled with overall economic recovery 
and consequent recovery in the financial markets, as in the optimistic scenario, this would in fact 
slightly drag down projected current account balances.45,46   
 
5.3 What if China Liberalizes and Develops Its Financial Markets? 
We can similarly consider alternative scenarios for financial development and capital 
account liberalization in China (Figure 13).  The figure shows, for comparison, the same 
projection as in Figure 11 with the dotted grey line.  It also shows the forecast if China’s level of 
financial openness increases moderately to the level of Thailand in 2008 (blue).  In this case the 
current account surplus falls significantly, in line with the predictions of the proponents of the 
                                                 
44 Three percentage points are equivalent to 1.5 standard deviations in the distribution of U.S. budget balances in the 
1969 – 2008 period.  
45 Consistent with the Caballero et al. effect. 
46 However, one factor that may improve U.S. current account balances would be the ongoing deleveraging efforts 
by U.S. households. Given the magnitude of the increase in the level of household leverage prior to the crisis, and 
given the significant impact of the financial crisis especially on the labor market, it is likely that deleveraging will 
contribute to improving the U.S. current account balance. 
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saving glut argument.  The figure also shows what happens when financial liberalization 
proceeds to Brazilian (green) and then Mexican (orange) levels.47  Again, this leads to further 
declines in the current account surplus. Thus, financial liberalization may lead to an increase in 
net capital inflows and thereby to a deterioration of current account balances.48 
Figure 14 makes alternative assumptions about financial development.  Recall that this is 
measured by the average ratio of domestic credit to GDP, which fell, relative to the world 
average, between 2001-5 and 2006-8.49  A modest assumption about Chinese financial 
development over the next five years is that this ratio returns to its 2001-5 levels.  If we place 
this assumption with Mexican levels of financial openness, this is enough to eliminate China’s 
surplus.  As a caution, note that the model, based on average behavior in a cross-section of 
emerging markets, under-predicts the Chinese surplus in recent years.  That the surplus 
disappears in 2015 under this scenario is at least as much an artifact of this under-prediction as it 
is a consequence of the financial liberalization and development.  But the point remains: how 
quickly China narrows its surplus will be a function in part, of how much progress it makes in 
financial liberalization and development. Furthermore, given that the return of PCGDP to the 
2001-05 level alone (blue dotted line that almost overlaps the grey one) hardly changes the 
predicted current account level, and that the predicted level declines only when financial 
development is coupled with financial liberalization, we surmise that financial liberalization 
would be more effective than financial development in reducing China’s current account 
surplus.50 However, as we saw previously, our estimation model consistently underpredicts 
                                                 
47 The countries are ranked as Mexico (69.2 in the 100 scale), Brazil (58.8), Thailand (40.3), and China (16.1) in 
terms of the level of finanial openness as of 2008. The average of KAOPEN for the LDC group as of 2008 is 50.2 
whereras that for the EMG group is 60.9. 
48 If capital account opening occurs while exchange rates are allowed to adjust more flexibly, the current account 
balance could also deteriorate through the price channel. Before the policy change of increasing the flexibility of the 
renminbi on June 19, 2010, it had been argued that one of the reasons for Chinese hesitation to allow greater 
exchange rate flexibility is that policy makers in Beijing are worried that financial liberalization may lead to further 
capital inflows, reinforcing the upward pressure on the currency. 
49 Recall that in our empirical model all variables are normalized by the world average. 
50 This conclusion relies upon our proxy of financial development, the ratio of private credit creation to GDP, 
accurately representing financial development. It would be preferable to use a broader measure of financial 
development, such as the composite bond/equity/bank indicators used in Ito and Chinn (2009), but the data are not 
yet available for that exercise.  
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China’s current account surplus. This indicates that, besides financial development and 
liberalization, other policies specific to China’s situation will be necessary.51  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We re-examine the determinants of current account balances applying updated data to the 
framework based on Chinn and Ito (2007). The main purpose of this study is to examine whether 
the determinants of global current account balances changed during the period preceding the 
global crisis of 2008-09 while inquiring into the prospects for the global imbalances in the post-
crisis period.  
Based on our estimates, changes in the budget balance appear to be an important factor 
affecting current account balances for advanced current account deficit countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The effect of the “saving glut variables” on current 
account balances has been relatively stable for emerging market countries, suggesting the 
prominence of those factors is not a particularly recent phenomenon. We also find the 2006-08 
period to be the structural break for emerging market countries, and to a lesser extent, for 
industrialized countries. The standard model’s prediction errors are correlated with household 
leverage, measured as debt to personal income. Hence, the pre-crisis imbalances do appear to be 
related to developments in the financial markets. 
When we investigate what can explain the anomalous behavior in the current account 
balances during the 2006-08 period, we find that stock market performance and real housing 
appreciation explain the unusual behavior in the pre-crisis period; fiscal procyclicality and 
monetary policy stance do not seem to matter as much. However, we also identify components of 
current account balances that can be only explained by country-specific factors. Extrapolating to 
the future, we find that for the U.S., fiscal consolidation alone cannot induce significant current 
account deficit reduction. For China, financial development may help shrink its current account 
surplus, but only when it is coupled with financial liberalization. These findings suggest that 
unless countries implement substantial policy changes, the global imbalances are unlikely to 
disappear. 
                                                 
51 For example, how and by how much the government implements a rule that requires state-owned enterprises to 
pay dividends to the government can be an important policy to help reduce the enormous corporate sector saving in 
the country (See Ma and Wang, 2010 and Kuijs, 2006, Chinn and Ito, 2011). 
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Appendix 1: Data Appendix 
We provide below a listing of the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions 
of these variables and the source(s) from which the primary data for constructing these variables 
were taken.  
 
Mnemonic Source*   Variable description 
CAGDP WDI, WEO  Current account to GDP ratio 
NSGDP WDI, WEO  National saving to GDP ratio 
KFGDP WDI, WEO  Capital formation to GDP ratio 
GOVBGDP WDI, IFS, WEO  General government budget balance, ratio to GDP 
NFAGDP LM   Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP 
RELY PWT Relative per capita income, adjusted by PPP 
exchange rates, Measured relative  to the U.S., 
range (0 to 1) 
RELDEPYWDI  Youth dependency ratio (relative to mean across all 
countries), Population under 15 / Population 
between 15 and 65 
RELDEPO WDI Old dependency ratio (relative to mean across all 
countries), Population over 65 / Population between 
15 and 65 
YGRAVG WDI   Average real GDP growth 
TOT WDI   Terms of trade 
OPEN WDI Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of 
goods and nonfactor services to GDP 
PCGDP WBFS Banking development, ratio of private credit to 
GDP 
SMTV WBFS Equity market development, stock market total 
value as a ratio to GDP 
SMTO WBFS   Equity market development, stock market turnover 
PVBM WBFS   Private bond market capitalization as a ratio to GDP 
PBBM WBFS   Public bond market capitalization as a ratio to GDP 
KAOPEN CI    Capital account openness 
BQ ICRG   Quality of Bureaucracy 
LAO ICRG   Law and order 
CORRUPT ICRG   Corruption index 
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LEGAL authors’ calculations General level of legal development, first principal 
component of BQ, LAO, and CORRUPT.  
FIS_PRO  authors’ calculations Correlations between HP-detrended government 
spending series and HP-detrended real GDP series;  
FIX RR Dummy for the fixed exchange rate regime: 
assigned the value of 1 if a country is assigned the 
value of 1 in a year in the “coarse version” of the 
Rogoff-Reinhart exchange rate regime indexes 
(2004, updated in 2009); otherwise, zero;52  
IR WDI International reserves as a ratio (excluding gold) to 
GDP 
REAL_INT WDI Real interest rate: Lending rate minus the rate of 
inflation based on GDP deflators, obtained from 
WDI 
HOUSEP CEIC, others Real housing price index: housing price index 
deflated by CPI 
 
* These are mnemonics for the sources used to construct the corresponding. CI: Chinn and Ito 
(2006); DPI2004: ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics; LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); OECD: OECD Economic Outlook Database; 
PWT: Penn World Table 6.4; RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, updated); WBFS: World Bank 
Financial Structure Database; WDI: World Development Indicators; and WEO: World Economic 
Outlook. 
                                                 
52 The most frequent type of the exchange rate regime is chosen for the 2005-08 period. 
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Appendix 2: Assumptions of Out-of-sample Forecasting Exercise 
Variables Assumptions 
Government budget balance 
World Economic Outlook projections (WEO, September 
2011) are used.  
Net foreign assets (initial) 
The level of net foreign assets is assumed to remain the 
same as of 2004 (the last year used for the estimation).  
Relative income 
The relative income series (originally based on Penn 
World Tables) is extrapolated using the growth rates 
calculated based on the WEO’s series of per capita income 
in international PPP. 
Youth and Old dependency ratios 
Forecasts from the UN World Population Prospects 
Database are used.  
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) 
This is a difficult variable to project. The global crisis 
must surely have made private credit creation smaller for 
many countries, but this may not be the case for some 
(e.g., China). Also, GDP, the denominator for this 
variable, shrunk for many countries, which can make the 
variable PCGDP relatively stable even for countries whose 
private credit also shrunk. We use the average of the 
variable (though as deviations from the world weighted 
averages) during the 2001-08 period.  For China we 
consider a range of alternative assumptions. 
Legal development (LEGAL) We assume no change. 
Financial openness (KAOPEN) 
For the U.S., U.K., Germany, Japan, and Rep. of Korea, 
we assume that the level of KAOPEN as of 2012-16 to 
remain the same as in 2008. For China, we consider a 
range of alternative assumptions. 
TOT volatility We assume no change. 
Average GDP growth 
We use the data from the World Economic Outlook, 
September 2011. 
Trade openness We assume no change  
Dummy for 2012-16 
Since we have no estimated coefficient on the dummy for 
the 2012-16 period, we use the average of the time fixed-
effects for the other previous panels.  
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Table 1: Current Account Regression WITHOUT Institutional Variables 
 Current Account
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full 
Industrial 
Countries 
(IDC) 
Less Developed 
(LDC) 
EMG 
Government budget balance 0.283 0.414 0.28 0.121 
 [0.064]*** [0.086]*** [0.068]*** [0.065]* 
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.039 0.089 0.029 0.023 
 [0.005]*** [0.014]*** [0.006]*** [0.013]* 
Relative income 0.058 0.023 0.097 0.226 
 [0.015]*** [0.017] [0.020]*** [0.090]** 
Relative income squared 0.073 -0.104 0.072 0.141 
 [0.019]*** [0.082] [0.018]*** [0.079]* 
Dependency ratio (young) -0.045 0.012 -0.034 -0.02 
 [0.015]*** [0.023] [0.017]** [0.018] 
Dependency ratio (old) -0.026 0.013 -0.025 -0.055 
 [0.009]*** [0.017] [0.011]** [0.019]*** 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) -0.016 -0.025 0.012 -0.008 
 [0.011] [0.016] [0.013] [0.016] 
TOT volatility 0.007 -0.1 -0.009 -0.005 
 [0.020] [0.053]* [0.022] [0.024] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.183 0.056 -0.207 0.033 
 [0.121] [0.173] [0.132] [0.121] 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 
 [0.006] [0.013] [0.008]* [0.010]* 
Oil exporting countries 0.034 – 0.033 0.057 
 [0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.016]*** 
Dummy for 2001-05 0.014 0.023 0.017 0.039 
 [0.011] [0.010]** [0.018] [0.017]** 
Dummy for 2006-08 0.007 0.01 0.015 0.021 
 [0.013] [0.011] [0.020] [0.021] 
Observations 670 180 491 257 
Adjusted R-squared  0.45 0.5 0.47 0.43 
 
Note: Time fixed effects are included in the estimation, but only those for the 2001-05 and 2006-08 
periods are reported in the table. 
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Table 2-1: Current Account Regression with Institutional Variables 
 Current Account
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Full 
Industrial Countries
(IDC) 
Less Developed 
(LDC) 
EMG 
Government budget balance 0.295 0.289 0.279 0.094 
 [0.058]*** [0.086]*** [0.063]*** [0.054]* 
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.037 0.078 0.028 0.026 
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]** 
Relative income 0.09 0.018 0.135 0.284 
 [0.018]*** [0.022] [0.022]*** [0.093]*** 
Relative income squared 0.055 0.02 0.046 0.16 
 [0.018]*** [0.094] [0.017]*** [0.081]* 
Dependency ratio (young) -0.033 0.004 -0.029 -0.029 
 [0.015]** [0.025] [0.017]* [0.019] 
Dependency ratio (old) -0.019 0.057 -0.022 -0.068 
 [0.010]** [0.021]*** [0.011]** [0.020]*** 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) -0.027 -0.02 0 -0.117 
 [0.014]* [0.010]* [0.029] [0.038]*** 
Legal development (LEGAL) -0.008 0.015 -0.015 -0.018 
 [0.005]* [0.005]*** [0.007]** [0.012] 
PCGDP x LEGAL -0.011 -0.014 -0.007 -0.032 
 [0.008] [0.012] [0.008] [0.014]** 
Financial open. (KAOPEN) 0.002 0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
 [0.005] [0.004]* [0.008] [0.009] 
KAOPEN x LEGAL 0.003 0.012 -0.001 0.004 
 [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.003] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP 0.002 0.028 0.003 -0.02 
 [0.007] [0.010]*** [0.008] [0.010]* 
TOT volatility 0 0.028 -0.01 0.023 
 [0.023] [0.047] [0.024] [0.025] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.097 0.178 -0.09 0.072 
 [0.091] [0.178] [0.099] [0.117] 
Trade openness -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0 
 [0.006] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] 
Oil exporting countries 0.028 – 0.025 0.045 
 [0.013]** – [0.012]** [0.016]*** 
Dummy for 2001-05 0.025 0.015 0.033 0.041 
 [0.009]*** [0.009]* [0.015]** [0.017]** 
Dummy for 2006-08 0.017 0.002 0.032 0.019 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.018]* [0.022] 
Observations 621 174 447 250 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5 0.63 0.52 0.46 
 
Note: Time fixed effects are included in the estimation, but only those for the 2001-05 and 2006-08 
periods are reported in the table. 
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Table 2-2: National Saving and Investment Regression with Institutional Variables 
 National Saving Investment 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Full 
Industrial Countries
(IDC) 
Less Developed 
(LDC) 
EMG Full 
Industrial Countries
(IDC) 
Less Developed 
(LDC) 
EMG 
Government budget balance 0.432 0.476 0.419 0.2 0.033 0.304 0.022 -0.011 
 [0.111]*** [0.087]*** [0.121]*** [0.071]*** [0.034] [0.126]** [0.033] [0.061] 
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.022 0.072 0.017 0.053 -0.007 -0.014 -0.003 0.012 
 [0.014] [0.008]*** [0.015] [0.015]*** [0.004]* [0.010] [0.005] [0.013] 
Relative income 0.015 0 0.036 -0.054 -0.037 -0.006 -0.051 -0.264 
 [0.034] [0.027] [0.044] [0.093] [0.018]** [0.032] [0.022]** [0.075]*** 
Relative income squared 0.054 -0.176 0.063 -0.238 0 -0.225 0.019 -0.342 
 [0.035] [0.116] [0.031]** [0.097]** [0.018] [0.155] [0.018] [0.071]*** 
Dependency ratio (young) -0.06 -0.088 -0.035 -0.057 -0.05 -0.097 -0.033 -0.046 
 [0.017]*** [0.025]*** [0.022] [0.020]*** [0.013]*** [0.026]*** [0.014]** [0.018]** 
Dependency ratio (old) -0.019 -0.017 -0.007 -0.083 -0.006 -0.058 0.006 -0.013 
 [0.015] [0.021] [0.017] [0.020]*** [0.009] [0.020]*** [0.010] [0.019] 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) 0.02 0.017 0.073 -0.091 0.037 0.026 0.073 0.046 
 [0.017] [0.011] [0.059] [0.053]* [0.008]*** [0.012]** [0.031]** [0.043] 
Legal development (LEGAL) -0.012 0.011 -0.019 -0.034 -0.002 -0.01 0.007 -0.015 
 [0.007]* [0.006]* [0.012] [0.015]** [0.004] [0.006]* [0.008] [0.014] 
PCGDP x LEGAL -0.02 -0.028 -0.016 -0.045 0 -0.003 0.013 0.001 
 [0.008]** [0.013]** [0.014] [0.018]** [0.004] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015] 
Financial open. (KAOPEN) -0.004 -0.004 -0.013 -0.001 -0.011 -0.01 -0.016 -0.006 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.012] [0.010] [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.006]** [0.007] 
KAOPEN x LEGAL -0.002 0.01 -0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 
 [0.001] [0.003]*** [0.004] [0.004] [0.001]*** [0.005] [0.002]** [0.003] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP 0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 
 [0.009] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] [0.005] [0.011] [0.008] [0.012] 
TOT volatility -0.024 0.314 -0.051 -0.066 0.017 0.252 -0.003 -0.052 
 [0.039] [0.053]*** [0.044] [0.035]* [0.022] [0.045]*** [0.025] [0.031]* 
Avg. GDP growth 0.692 0.417 0.695 1.129 0.951 0.38 0.944 1.143 
 [0.165]*** [0.252] [0.190]*** [0.169]*** [0.094]*** [0.268] [0.097]*** [0.127]*** 
Trade openness 0.021 0.033 0.024 0.033 0.02 0.023 0.025 0.035 
 [0.007]*** [0.016]** [0.013]* [0.012]*** [0.005]*** [0.012]* [0.008]*** [0.009]*** 
Oil exporting countries 0.078 – 0.086 0.032 0.049 – 0.059 0.01 
 [0.018]*** – [0.020]*** [0.017]* [0.012]*** – [0.011]*** [0.015] 
Dummy for 2001-05 0.007 -0.053 0.062 0.048 -0.028 -0.08 0.013 -0.005 
 [0.013] [0.012]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]** [0.014]* [0.021]*** [0.014] [0.018] 
Dummy for 2006-08 0.027 -0.041 0.097 0.045 -0.011 -0.058 0.031 0.014 
 [0.015]* [0.012]*** [0.023]*** [0.026]* [0.015] [0.020]*** [0.016]* [0.020] 
Observations 621 174 447 250 621 174 447 250 
Adjusted R-squared  0.46 0.63 0.49 0.57 0.35 0.46 0.39 0.5 
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Table 3: Beta Coefficients in the Current Account Regression 
 Full IDC LDC EMG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gov't budget balance 0.269*** 0.223*** 0.260*** 0.005* 
NFA (initial cond.) 0.363*** 0.543*** 0.279*** 0.013** 
Relative Income 0.229** 0.057 0.266*** 0.025*** 
Relative Income, sq. 0.079*** 0.009 0.032*** 0.006** 
Relative Dependency Ratio (young) -0.206** 0.013 -0.121* -0.009 
Relative Dependency Ratio (old) -0.158** 0.204*** -0.113** -0.024*** 
Financial Development (PCGDP) -0.036 -0.245 0.044 -0.005 
LEGAL      -0.164** -0.053 -0.196** -0.007 
PCGDP x LEGAL -0.105 -0.177 -0.047 -0.017** 
Financial openness (KAOPEN) -0.104** -0.612** -0.173*** -0.006 
KAOPEN x LEGAL 0.095*** 0.560*** -0.021 0.008 
KAOPEN x PCGDP 0.018 0.309*** 0.017 -0.010* 
TOT volatility 0.001 0.034 -0.017 0.003 
output growth, 5-yr average -0.037 0.053 -0.035 0.002 
Trade Openness -0.007 -0.010 -0.032 0.000 
Oil Exporters 0.110**  0.106** 0.012*** 
Dummy-2005 0.126*** 0.104* 0.156** 0.014** 
Dummy-2008 0.076 0.011 0.129* 0.006 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The p-values are not necessarily similar to those in Table 2-1 since both the dependent and independent variables are 
standardized in this estimation. Time fixed effects are included in the estimation, but only those for the 2001-05 and 2006-08 periods are reported in the table. 
The estimates shown here are “beta coefficients” which indicate by how many standard deviations the current account balances would change if an 
explanatory variable changes by one standard deviation.  
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Table 4: Impacts of “Leveraging” on Current Account Balances 
 HH-
leverage1 
HH-
leverage2 
Gov’t-
leverage 
HH lev.1 & 
G-leverage 
HH lev.2 & 
G-leverage 
HH-lev.1 
w/ int. 
HH-lev.2 
w/ int. 
G-lev. 
w/ int. 
HH & G-
lev.1 w/ int. 
HH & G-
lev.2 w/ int. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Gov't budget balance 0.431 0.405 0.331 0.582 0.763 0.438 0.389 0.337 0.619 0.687 
 (0.115)*** (0.316) (0.088)*** (0.121)*** (0.529) (0.120)*** (0.280) (0.087)*** (0.125)*** (0.416) 
Lane's NFA  0.046 0.006 0.084 0.047 0.007 0.046 -0.004 0.076 0.046 -0.008 
(initial cond.) (0.010)*** (0.026) (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.023) (0.010)*** (0.025) (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.019) 
Relative income 0.030 0.102 0.030 -0.002 0.095 0.029 0.106 0.043 -0.008 0.101 
 (0.041) (0.056)* (0.022) (0.037) (0.051)* (0.042) (0.052)* (0.023)* (0.040) (0.042)** 
Relative income sq. 0.057 -0.150 -0.011 0.014 -0.133 0.059 -0.189 0.017 0.020 -0.128 
 (0.101) (0.196) (0.071) (0.091) (0.213) (0.102) (0.202) (0.066) (0.107) (0.179) 
Young dependency  -0.074 -0.001 -0.041 -0.065 -0.000 -0.076 -0.001 -0.025 -0.064 -0.006 
ratio (0.040)* (0.061) (0.026) (0.038)* (0.062) (0.041)* (0.060) (0.024) (0.039) (0.059) 
Old dependency ratio  0.045 0.187 0.003 0.052 0.192 0.043 0.146 0.006 0.044 0.208 
 (0.030) (0.056)*** (0.020) (0.030)* (0.056)*** (0.031) (0.054)** (0.018) (0.031) (0.043)*** 
Fin Dev. - PCGDP -0.027 -0.020 -0.016 -0.036 -0.022 -0.028 -0.022 -0.010 -0.040 -0.010 
 (0.012)** (0.029) (0.011) (0.012)*** (0.028) (0.013)** (0.026) (0.011) (0.012)*** (0.023) 
Legal/Institutional  0.021 0.032 0.006 0.028 0.032 0.021 0.024 0.004 0.028 0.025 
variable (0.005)*** (0.012)** (0.006) (0.007)*** (0.012)** (0.005)*** (0.014)* (0.005) (0.006)*** (0.013)* 
pcgdp x legal 0.036 0.045 -0.019 0.047 0.050 0.036 0.046 -0.013 0.051 0.053 
 (0.014)** (0.015)*** (0.013) (0.011)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)** (0.016)*** (0.010) (0.012)*** (0.014)*** 
Financial Openness  0.006 -0.022 0.004 0.001 -0.025 0.007 -0.026 0.002 0.002 -0.041 
(KAOPEN) (0.011) (0.024) (0.004) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011) (0.024) (0.003) (0.011) (0.021)* 
KAOPEN x legal 0.029 0.027 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.029 0.024 0.015 0.017 0.027 
 (0.008)*** (0.016) (0.004)*** (0.008)** (0.019) (0.008)*** (0.015) (0.003)*** (0.008)** (0.017) 
KAOPEN x pcgdp -0.022 -0.021 0.004 -0.025 -0.022 -0.022 -0.030 -0.000 -0.027 -0.051 
 (0.011)* (0.036) (0.011) (0.009)*** (0.038) (0.011)* (0.038) (0.008) (0.011)** (0.031) 
Dummy-2005 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.010 -0.008 0.012 0.002 0.007 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) 
Dummy-2008 0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.007 -0.013 0.005 0.011 -0.001 0.018 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
HH's leverage 1 -0.183   -0.248  -0.177   -0.243  
 (0.109)*   (0.091)***  (0.109)11%   (0.090)***  
HH's leverage 2 (mortgage)  0.029   -0.001  0.005   -0.012 
  (0.052)   (0.060)  (0.060)   (0.065) 
Govt's leverage   -0.097 0.178 0.277   -0.009 0.190 0.057 
   (0.050)* (0.078)** (0.237)   (0.042) (0.097)* (0.216) 
HH-lev1 x d2008      -0.044   -0.121  
      (0.073)   (0.069)*  
HH-lev2 x d2008       -0.200   -0.137 
       (0.153)   (0.111) 
Gov’t-lev x d2008        -0.354 -0.004 0.533 
        (0.120)*** (0.130) (0.214)** 
R2 0.90 0.91 0.72 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.75 0.92 0.94 
N 65 40 148 65 40 65 40 148 65 40 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The estimates for GDP growth, TOT volatility, and  trade openness are omitted  to conserve space. 
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Table 5: Out-of-sample Predictions Errors and Probabilities 
(a) Industrialized countries 
 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08 
 Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values 
Australia 0.2% 0.463 -0.5% 0.433 -2.1% 0.293 -1.6% 0.328 
Austria -1.0% 0.347 -1.6% 0.269 2.6% 0.246 2.7% 0.218 
Belgium 4.0% 0.045 4.0% 0.063 0.5% 0.448 -2.9% 0.208 
Canada 0.4% 0.433 2.2% 0.204 2.0% 0.302 1.6% 0.330 
Denmark 4.9% 0.029 2.9% 0.145 3.2% 0.198 0.2% 0.482 
Finland 2.2% 0.194 8.8% 0.001 10.1% 0.005 1.1% 0.384 
France 2.3% 0.159 3.8% 0.070 0.9% 0.407 -0.7% 0.421 
Germany -3.1% 0.102 -1.4% 0.292 2.1% 0.285 5.0% 0.076 
Greece 0.0% 0.496 -4.6% 0.085 -3.3% 0.215 -5.9% 0.057 
Iceland 3.9% 0.053 -1.8% 0.245 -1.9% 0.314 -17.2% 0.001 
Ireland 5.2% 0.040 1.4% 0.335 -1.0% 0.395 -2.7% 0.239 
Italy -1.0% 0.380 0.7% 0.418 0.0% 0.498 -0.1% 0.490 
Japan -0.5% 0.413 0.5% 0.427 1.4% 0.361 1.3% 0.362 
Malta -5.2% 0.032 -7.8% 0.012 -1.9% 0.330 -6.6% 0.046 
Netherlands 1.4% 0.311 2.5% 0.230 5.5% 0.077 6.9% 0.027 
New Zealand 1.5% 0.279 0.6% 0.419 -1.4% 0.354 -2.7% 0.225 
Norway 3.3% 0.116 5.5% 0.036 9.5% 0.011 5.6% 0.102 
Portugal -0.7% 0.418 -8.3% 0.005 -5.6% 0.090 -4.5% 0.126 
Spain -1.6% 0.286 -2.3% 0.237 -3.7% 0.177 -6.0% 0.059 
Sweden 1.8% 0.233 5.1% 0.027 3.6% 0.172 6.1% 0.040 
Switzerland -- -- 5.2% 0.045 4.6% 0.123 0.2% 0.473 
United Kingdom -1.0% 0.338 -0.4% 0.436 -1.8% 0.310 -1.7% 0.313 
United States 0.3% 0.454 -2.2% 0.209 -3.4% 0.194 -3.4% 0.184 
Subsample average 0.8% 0.255 0.5% 0.202 0.9% 0.252 -1.1% 0.226 
# of countries w. p < 0.05  4  6  2  4 
# of countries w. lowest p.  5  8  5  9 
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Table 5 (continued): Out-of-sample Predictions Errors and Probabilities 
(b) Emerging market countries 
 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08 
 Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values Pred. errors p-values 
Argentina -2.5% 0.299 -5.4% 0.118 7.5% 0.038 -- -- 
Bangladesh -- -- -- -- 2.1% 0.314 2.5% 0.260 
Botswana 8.9% 0.057 5.5% 0.139 3.9% 0.214 10.2% 0.010 
Brazil 5.3% 0.114 -1.3% 0.370 2.5% 0.276 3.2% 0.198 
Bulgaria 7.0% 0.083 3.4% 0.218 -1.9% 0.335 -17.8% 0.000 
Chile 0.6% 0.448 0.6% 0.437 1.7% 0.337 3.3% 0.191 
China 1.9% 0.326 4.5% 0.122 4.1% 0.158 10.2% 0.003 
Colombia 1.8% 0.327 -0.1% 0.488 1.8% 0.332 0.0% 0.497 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.8% 0.441 3.7% 0.194 7.3% 0.043 -- -- 
Ecuador -0.5% 0.458 3.3% 0.198 3.0% 0.242 8.4% 0.017 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8.6% 0.019 1.1% 0.386 5.7% 0.080 3.6% 0.170 
Ghana -1.6% 0.356 -2.1% 0.302 2.8% 0.262 -10.1% 0.004 
Hong Kong, China -1.5% 0.426 1.2% 0.406 2.9% 0.279 -2.7% 0.301 
Hungary 5.4% 0.135 -6.1% 0.094 -6.1% 0.115 -2.2% 0.316 
India 1.9% 0.324 1.0% 0.399 2.8% 0.245 -0.3% 0.468 
Indonesia 7.1% 0.116 5.7% 0.084 8.7% 0.028 6.4% 0.059 
Israel -1.0% 0.412 -1.1% 0.401 2.7% 0.256 4.2% 0.140 
Jamaica 2.8% 0.272 0.4% 0.461 -2.1% 0.321 -- -- 
Jordan -4.4% 0.205 3.5% 0.195 2.9% 0.240 -10.9% 0.002 
Kenya 0.8% 0.433 -11.6% 0.005 1.6% 0.358 -2.1% 0.294 
Korea, Rep. -2.6% 0.271 2.0% 0.317 0.2% 0.478 -1.9% 0.308 
Malaysia -5.2% 0.097 10.1% 0.007 12.6% 0.002 16.2% 0.000 
Mexico -4.6% 0.147 -1.5% 0.362 1.7% 0.340 1.9% 0.307 
Morocco 1.0% 0.400 2.3% 0.277 5.3% 0.101 -0.5% 0.450 
Nigeria 4.7% 0.202 11.3% 0.008 16.7% 0.000 -- -- 
Pakistan -0.5% 0.446 1.8% 0.320 5.5% 0.096 -4.1% 0.134 
Peru -4.2% 0.192 -1.3% 0.388 5.1% 0.127 5.1% 0.109 
Philippines -0.9% 0.419 0.4% 0.464 4.2% 0.164 7.2% 0.032 
Poland 7.8% 0.041 -2.5% 0.276 0.1% 0.492 -1.0% 0.397 
Singapore 10.4% 0.058 11.6% 0.028 9.1% 0.049 3.5% 0.289 
South Africa 3.5% 0.204 2.5% 0.280 0.0% 0.496 -7.4% 0.028 
Sri Lanka -1.7% 0.364 -0.2% 0.480 2.7% 0.269 -2.0% 0.302 
Thailand -5.0% 0.113 8.9% 0.017 4.4% 0.144 4.2% 0.132 
Trinidad and Tobago 8.1% 0.070 -1.7% 0.369 10.4% 0.022 29.2% 0.000 
Tunisia -0.1% 0.491 2.3% 0.282 1.2% 0.393 0.3% 0.471 
Turkey 0.6% 0.446 1.1% 0.393 3.4% 0.219 -- -- 
Venezuela, RB 1.9% 0.356 2.4% 0.318 12.9% 0.002 -- -- 
Zimbabwe -1.4% 0.362 0.7% 0.429 -- -- -- -- 
Subsample average 1.4% 0.268 1.5% 0.271 4.0% 0.213 1.8% 0.190 
# of countries w. p < 0.05  2  5  8  10 
# of countries w. lowest p.  15  12  18  21 
44 
Table 6: Determinants of the Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors of CAB 
Dependent variable = Out-of-sample Prediction errors  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Average Change in Stock market development  -0.319 -0.295 -0.128 -0.225 -0.060 -0.117 -0.102 -0.168 -0.060 
(SMTV) in 2002-06 [0.133]** [0.130]** [0.101] [0.132]* (0.078) (0.092) (0.080) (0.100) (0.078) 
Fiscal Procyclicality in 2006-08 -0.006 -0.022 0.011 -0.005 0.015 0.003 0.014 -0.001 0.015 
 [0.017] [0.018] [0.016] [0.018] (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
Dummy for the Fixed/Pegged  -0.037 -0.046 -0.019 -0.028 -0.021 -0.029 -0.013 -0.021 -0.021 
   Exchange Rate Regime [0.022]* [0.023]* [0.018]12% [0.017] (0.015) (0.014)* (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Int’l Reserves (% of GDP) as of 2005 0.093 0.051 0.083 0.05 0.015 -0.004 0.050 0.030 0.015 
 [0.050]* [0.045] [0.057] [0.043] (0.041) (0.039) (0.049) (0.039) (0.041) 
Real Interest Rate as of 2005 -0.083 -0.054 -0.051 -0.045 -0.125 -0.117 -0.137 -0.121 -0.125 
 [0.117] [0.115] [0.071] [0.074] (0.069)* (0.076) (0.072)* (0.073) (0.069)* 
Average Change in Private bond market    -0.281 -0.617    -0.421 -0.438 
development (PVBM) in 2002-06   [0.055]*** [0.318]*    (0.234)* (0.245)* 
Average Change in Public bond market    -0.065 -0.218    -0.484 -0.528 
development (PBBM) in 2002-06   [0.238] [0.252]    (0.192)** (0.193)** 
Average Housing Appreciation Rate in       -0.730 -0.698 -0.656 -0.593 
2002-06      (0.163)*** (0.175)*** (0.121)*** (0.115)*** 
Dummy for the U.S.  -0.118  -0.071   -0.066  -0.062 
  [0.037]***  [0.034]**   (0.030)**  (0.031)* 
Dummy for China  0.111  0.103   0.068  0.075 
  [0.022]***  [0.017]***   (0.011)***  (0.012)*** 
Dummy for Greece  -0.065  -0.064   -0.050  -0.065 
  [0.023]***  [0.018]***   (0.014)***  (0.012)*** 
Dummy for Iceland  -0.121  0.193   --  -- 
  [0.035]***  [0.173]   --  -- 
Observations 58 58 36 36 35 35 35 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.31 0.47 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.69 0.56 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1
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Table 7: Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16 
 
CAB  
as of  
2006-08 
IMF 
Projection 
for 2012-16 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Forecast  
(2008)n 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Difference 
from IMF 
projection 
Forecast  
(2005)n 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Difference 
from IMF 
projection 
 (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) (4) (5)=(4)-(1) (6)=(4)-(2) (7) (8)=(7)-(1) (9)=(7)-(2) 
Industrial Countries          
Australia -5.7% -5.6% 0.1% -4.2% 1.5% 1.5% -4.4% 1.3% 1.2% 
Austria 3.0% 2.8% -0.2% 0.2% -2.8% -2.6% -0.6% -3.6% -3.4% 
Belgium 0.4% 1.7% 1.3% 2.8% 2.4% 1.1% 1.8% 1.4% 0.1% 
Canada 2.2% -3.0% -5.3% 0.0% -2.2% 3.1% -0.4% -2.7% 2.6% 
Denmark 1.9% 5.9% 4.0% 0.8% -1.1% -5.1% -0.4% -2.3% -6.3% 
Finland 3.9% 2.5% -1.4% 4.5% 0.7% 2.0% 1.4% -2.4% -1.0% 
France -1.2% -2.5% -1.3% 0.1% 1.4% 2.6% -1.2% 0.0% 1.3% 
Germany 7.0% 4.5% -2.5% 2.8% -4.2% -1.8% 1.4% -5.6% -3.1% 
Greece -13.2% -4.8% 8.5% -10.5% 2.7% -5.8% -8.5% 4.7% -3.7% 
Iceland -27.8% 0.0% 27.7% -22.1% 5.6% -22.1% -13.0% 14.8% -13.0% 
Ireland -4.5% 1.4% 5.9% -4.6% -0.1% -6.0% -3.9% 0.6% -5.3% 
Italy -2.8% -2.3% 0.5% -3.9% -1.1% -1.6% -3.3% -0.4% -1.0% 
Japan 4.0% 2.5% -1.5% 3.9% 0.0% 1.4% 1.7% -2.3% -0.8% 
Malta -7.7% -5.6% 2.2% -2.4% 5.3% 3.1% -1.1% 6.6% 4.5% 
Netherlands 8.3% 6.8% -1.4% 1.1% -7.2% -5.7% 0.3% -7.9% -6.5% 
New Zealand -8.3% -6.4% 1.9% -5.7% 2.6% 0.7% -6.2% 2.2% 0.2% 
Norway 17.1% 11.7% -5.4% 11.7% -5.4% 0.0% 8.9% -8.2% -2.8% 
Portugal -10.6% -4.5% 6.0% -7.5% 3.1% -2.9% -6.8% 3.8% -2.2% 
Spain -9.6% -2.6% 7.0% -6.4% 3.2% -3.8% -5.9% 3.7% -3.3% 
Sweden 8.5% 5.0% -3.5% 4.5% -4.0% -0.5% 2.0% -6.5% -3.0% 
Switzerland 11.1% 10.5% -0.6% 12.6% 1.5% 2.1% 10.0% -1.1% -0.5% 
United Kingdom -2.6% -1.3% 1.3% -0.8% 1.8% 0.5% -1.7% 0.9% -0.4% 
United States -5.4% -2.1% 3.2% -3.8% 1.5% -1.7% -3.4% 2.0% -1.3% 
Emerging Market Economies         
Argentina 2.9% -1.1% -3.9% 0.5% -2.4% 1.6% -2.5% -5.4% -1.4% 
Bangladesh 1.5% -0.7% -2.2% 0.0% -1.5% 0.7% -2.6% -4.1% -1.9% 
Botswana 13.7% 0.8% -13.0% 7.5% -6.3% 6.7% 2.1% -11.6% 1.3% 
Brazil -0.1% -3.0% -2.9% -0.8% -0.6% 2.2% -3.9% -3.7% -0.9% 
Bulgaria -23.0% -2.1% 21.0% -5.0% 18.1% -2.9% -6.9% 16.1% -4.8% 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.4% -2.1% -3.4% -3.0% -4.4% -0.9% -5.3% -6.6% -3.2% 
Chile 2.4% -1.9% -4.3% 2.1% -0.3% 4.0% -1.5% -3.9% 0.4% 
China 10.1% 6.5% -3.6% 2.6% -7.5% -3.9% 0.1% -10.0% -6.5% 
Colombia -2.5% -2.2% 0.3% -1.3% 1.2% 0.9% -4.2% -1.7% -2.0% 
Ecuador 3.2% -3.3% -6.5% -3.3% -6.5% 0.0% -7.0% -10.1% -3.6% 
Continues to the next page         
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Table 7 (continued): Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16 
 
CAB  
as of  
2006-08 
IMF 
Projection 
for 2012-16 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Forecast  
(2008)n 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Difference 
from IMF 
projection 
Forecast  
(2005)n 
Change 
from  
2006-08 
Difference 
from IMF 
projection 
 (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) (4) (5)=(4)-(1) (6)=(4)-(2) (7) (8)=(7)-(1) (9)=(7)-(2) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.6% -2.1% -2.7% -1.7% -2.3% 0.4% -4.2% -4.8% -2.1% 
Ghana -14.8% -2.5% 12.4% -3.7% 11.2% -1.2% -5.6% 9.2% -3.2% 
Hong Kong, China 12.9% 6.4% -6.5% 25.8% 12.9% 19.4% 21.0% 8.1% 14.6% 
Hungary -7.5% -0.3% 7.2% -2.5% 5.0% -2.3% -5.8% 1.7% -5.6% 
India -1.7% -2.3% -0.6% -0.3% 1.3% 1.9% -2.7% -1.0% -0.4% 
Indonesia 1.8% -0.9% -2.7% -1.9% -3.7% -1.0% -5.6% -7.5% -4.8% 
Israel 2.8% 1.4% -1.4% 0.4% -2.4% -1.0% -1.8% -4.6% -3.2% 
Jamaica -14.5% -5.1% 9.4% -4.2% 10.2% 0.9% -7.1% 7.3% -2.0% 
Jordan -13.2% -6.5% 6.7% -1.6% 11.6% 4.8% -3.2% 10.0% 3.3% 
Kenya -4.0% -6.1% -2.2% 0.1% 4.1% 6.2% -3.3% 0.7% 2.9% 
Korea, Rep. 0.1% 1.2% 1.1% 6.7% 6.5% 5.5% 3.1% 3.0% 1.9% 
Malaysia 17.3% 9.6% -7.6% 2.5% -14.8% -7.2% 0.0% -17.2% -9.6% 
Mexico -0.9% -0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 1.0% 1.0% -4.1% -3.2% -3.2% 
Morocco -1.5% -3.1% -1.6% -0.9% 0.6% 2.2% -2.9% -1.3% 0.3% 
Nigeria 19.3% 8.2% -11.1% -1.3% -20.6% -9.5% -4.1% -23.4% -12.3% 
Pakistan -6.8% -2.5% 4.3% -1.6% 5.1% 0.9% -3.7% 3.1% -1.2% 
Peru 0.4% -2.7% -3.1% -1.5% -1.9% 1.2% -5.6% -6.0% -2.9% 
Philippines 4.0% 1.3% -2.7% -2.1% -6.1% -3.3% -4.5% -8.5% -5.8% 
Poland -4.3% -5.2% -0.9% -0.7% 3.6% 4.6% -3.7% 0.6% 1.5% 
Singapore 19.9% 16.3% -3.6% 27.6% 7.7% 11.3% 20.0% 0.1% 3.7% 
South Africa -7.1% -4.9% 2.2% 1.5% 8.5% 6.4% -1.4% 5.6% 3.5% 
Sri Lanka -6.3% -3.1% 3.2% -4.5% 1.8% -1.3% -6.2% 0.1% -3.1% 
Thailand 2.6% 1.1% -1.5% -0.5% -3.1% -1.6% -2.9% -5.5% -4.0% 
Trinidad and Tobago 31.9% 17.9% -13.9% 7.5% -24.4% -10.5% 0.4% -31.5% -17.5% 
Tunisia -2.9% -4.7% -1.7% -0.2% 2.8% 4.5% -3.7% -0.7% 1.0% 
Turkey -5.7% -6.9% -1.2% -0.9% 4.7% 5.9% -3.8% 1.9% 3.1% 
Venezuela, RB 12.0% 4.2% -7.8% 0.5% -11.5% -3.7% -2.1% -14.1% -6.3% 
Average 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% -1.8% -2.0% -2.0% 
Standard Deviation 10.2% 5.4% -4.8% 7.0% -3.2% 1.6% 5.6% -4.6% 0.2% 
Avg. of Surplus Countriesn 7.4% 3.6% -3.8% 3.7% -3.7% 0.1% 0.8% -6.6% -2.8% 
S.D. of Surplus Countriesn 7.6% 5.5% -2.1% 7.3% -0.3% 1.8% 6.5% -1.1% 1.0% 
Avg. of Deficit Countriesn -7.5% -3.4% 4.1% -3.4% 4.1% 0.0% -4.5% 2.9% -1.2% 
S.D. of Deficit Countriesn 6.5% 2.1% -4.4% 4.5% -2.0% 2.4% 2.5% -4.0% 0.3% 
Notes: “Forecast (2008)” and “Forecast (2005)” are the forecasts made using data through 2008 and 2005, respectively.  “Surplus countries” refer to the 
countries that ran current account surplus in the 2006-08 period, and “deficit countries” to those which ran current account deficit in the period. IMF 
projections are extracted froim WEO September 2011
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Figure 1: Current Account Balances as a Share of World GDP 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2011.  
Notes: 2011-2016 data are IMF projections. ‘US’ is United States, ‘OIL’ is oil exporting countries, 
‘DEU+JPN’ is Germany plus Japan, ‘OCADC’ is other advanced developed countries (as defined in 
WEO), ‘CHN+EMA’ is China plus other emerging Asia, and ‘ROW’ is rest of the world.  
Figure 2: U.S. Budget and Current Account Balances (% of GDP) 
 
Note: 2010-2016 data are IMF projections.  
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2011.
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Figure 3: Estimated Contributions to Current Accounts Balances  
(Using the Estimates from Model 2) 
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Figure 3 (continued): Estimated Contributions to Current Accounts Balances  
(using the Estimates from Model 2) 
Korea
Current Account
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Budget balance Net Foreign Asset Saving Glut vars Demography
Others Current Account CA predicted
 
Korea
Change in Current Account
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Change in Budget Balance Change in NFA Change in 'Saving Glut'
Change in Demography Change in Others Change in Current Account
Change in Pred. CA
 
Malaysia
Current Account
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Budget balance Net Foreign Asset Saving Glut vars Demography
Others Current Account CA predicted
 
Malaysia
Change in Current Account
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Change in Budget Balance Change in NFA Change in 'Saving Glut'
Change in Demography Change in Others Change in Current Account
Change in Pred. CA
 
China
Current Account
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Budget balance Net Foreign Asset Saving Glut vars Demography
Others Current Account CA predicted
China
Change in Current Account
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Change in Budget Balance Change in NFA Change in 'Saving Glut'
Change in Demography Change in Others Change in Current Account
Change in Pred. CA
 
Thailand
Current Account
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Budget balance Net Foreign Asset Saving Glut vars Demography
Others Current Account CA predicted
 
Thailand
Change in Current Account
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08
Change in Budget Balance Change in NFA Change in 'Saving Glut'
Change in Demography Change in Others Change in Current Account
Change in Pred. CA
50 
Figure 4: Growth Rates of ‘Leverage’ 
  (a) Growth rates of HH Leverage 1    (b) Growth rates of HH Leverage 2  
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  (c) Growth rates of HH Leverages 1and 2   (d) Growth rates of Government Leverage  
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Figure 5: The Estimates on the Interactions Between Country/Area Dummies  
and Time Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
Note: Insignificant estimates are shown as “zeros” in the figure.
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Figure 6: In-sample Predictions of Current Accounts (using the Estimates from Model 2) 
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Figure 6 (cont’d): In-sample Predictions of Current Accounts (using the Estimates from Model 2) 
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Figure 7: Distributions of Prediction Errors 
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Figure 8: Estimating the Probability of a Current Account Balance 
Using the Pseudo-Confidence Interval of Forecast 
(a) Retroactive Prediction Based on the Data up to 2005 
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(b) Retroactive Prediction Based on the Data up to 2000 
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Figure 9: Out-of-sample Predictions Errors for Current Account Balances in 2006-08  
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Figure 10: Prediction Errors vs. Real Appreciation Rate of Housing Values 
 (a) Growth Rate of Stock Market Total Value, 2002-06  (b) Real Appreciation Rate of Housing Values, 2002-06  
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(c) Growth Rate of Private Bond Market Cap., 2002-06  (d) Growth Rate of Public Bond Market Cap., 2002-06  
United States
United Kingdom
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Canada
Japan
Finland
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Australia
South Afri a Brazil
ColombiaHong Kong Indonesia
Korea Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
China
Hungary
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e 
of
 P
ri
v.
 B
on
d 
M
ar
ke
t, 
20
02
-0
6
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Prediction Errors
 Industrial countries  Developing countries
United States
United Kingdom
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Canada
Finland
Greece Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Australia
New Zealand
South Africa
Brazil
Colombia
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
PhilippinesSingapore
Thailand
China
Hungary
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e 
of
 P
ub
lic
 B
on
d 
M
ar
ke
t, 
20
02
-0
6
-.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Prediction Errors
 Industrial countries  Developing countries
Japan is omitted since its PBBM change is an outlier
 58
Figure 11: Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16 using data up to 2008 (red) or 2005 (grey) 
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Figure 11 (continuted): Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16  using data up to 2008 (red) or 2005 (grey) 
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Figure 11 (continued): Forecasts of Current Account Balances for 2012-16  using data up to 2008 (red) or 2005 (grey) 
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Figure 12: U.S. Current Account Projections for Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios 
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Figure 13: What if China Liberalizes Its Financial Markets 
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Figure 14: What if China both Develops and Liberalizes Its Financial Markets 
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